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Introduction 
 
After the transition to democracy in Southern Europe, administrative reform was 
necessary in order to make bureaucracies more accountable and responsive as well as 
more sensitive to the goals of economic modernisation and European integration. 
While such reforms were announced as necessary to increase efficiency and to 
improve responsiveness, they were often aborted, owing to bureaucratic resistance or 
to abrupt changes in reform plans after a new government came to power. 
However, since the transition to democracy the transformation of the 
administrative systems of Southern Europe has lapsed. Administrative reform has not 
evolved as the corresponding processes in other sub-systems of political system of 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. While the transition and consolidation of democracy 
in these countries saw the culmination of a long process of political and socio-economic 
modernization (Malefakis 1995), in the sector of the state bureaucracy there has been a 
slower pace of change, if not inertia. The state in Southern Europe has not changed a lot, 
even though Europeanization has effected pragmatic shifts in certain public policy areas, 
such as regional policy. However, the effects of Europeanization have not been uniform 
across South European states (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). The gradual 
integration of the states of Southern Europe into the EU may have led to some 
convergence of their bureaucratic structures with the corresponding structures of the rest 
of West European states, but, in contrast to modernization theory, this change has not 
been evolutionary. Adopting Philippe C. Schmitter’s perspective on partial democratic 
consolidation (1995: 285-286), we could argue that bureaucratic institutions are another 
case of ‘partial regime’ which was not fully consolidated even a long time after the 
transition to democracy.  
This does not mean that between the end of authoritarian regimes and today 
South European states have not changed at all.  By contrast, public expenditures, tax 
revenues and public employment all rose significantly. Between the mid – 1970s and 
the early 1990s, social rights were instituted, welfare policies were differentiated and 
expanded, administrative decentralization progressed and new channels of social 
participation ‘from below’ were created (Maravall 1993: 102-103). In the 1990s, new 
ideas about the state were imported from abroad, although they were transplanted 
with uneven success.   
For instance, the ideas of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) have not been 
applied consistently in the bureaucracies of Southern Europe. Such ideas were popular 
with other West European bureaucracies (Clark 2000: 25). Other relevant ideas 
referred to the retreat of the state from its habit of social and economic 
interventionism (Mueller and Wright 1994). Some influences of the above ideas may 
be traced in the following instances: in the aborted efforts of Italian reformers to 
separate clearly politics from administration and to make public managers out of 
senior civil servants; in the imitation of the international tendency to treat citizens and 
businesses as ‘clients’ of the bureaucracy, the satisfaction of whom should be a top 
priority; and in the introduction of fashionable management techniques to the day-
today operation of the bureaucracy.  
However, these ideas did not add up to a recasting of South European 
bureaucracies. Chances are that - in the last thirty years - the most important reforms 
of South European bureaucracies had nothing to do with ‘New Public Management.’ 
For instance, in Spain, ‘the most important reform’ was not the introduction of such a 
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kind of management, but ‘the territorial devolution of political power’ (Parrado 2000: 
247).  
The reasons may be found in the precipitation of simultaneous challenges, i.e. 
in the fact that South European bureaucracies were subjected to democratization, 
modernization and Europeanization, all taking place at about the same time, towards 
the close of the twentieth century. In contrast to other West European cases, the four 
bureaucracies under study did not develop into fully fledged Weberian 
administrations, subjected to the rule of law and to democratic control. In the span of 
the nineteenth and the twentieth century, they struggled with long traditions of 
authoritarianism and clientelism. Towards the end of the 20th century the effort to 
overcome past traditions coincided with the influence of new international trends, 
such as NPM. At that time, reformers of South European bureaucracies worked at 
cross-purposes, simultaneously trying to bring about more than one large-scale 
reforms. The result was that reforms were successful only to an extent. 
Democratization of the state apparatus was effected, but changes inspired by new 
international trends were implemented in a stop-and-go fashion. 
 
 
1. Overview and directions of change in South European bureaucracies 
 
South European bureaucracies may have not faithfully followed the above 
international trends, but they have not been ‘frozen’. They have evolved in three 
directions. First, in the direction of decentralisation which was quite extensive in Italy 
since the early 1970s and in Spain since the late 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s. In Italy, decentralisation progressed slowly in the 1970s and much more 
rapidly towards the end of the twentieth century (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 
1993). In Portugal after the regime change of April 1974, while the mainland 
remained governed in a centralised fashion, the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira 
acquired substantial autonomy and already in the mid-1970s was experiencing more 
political stability than the mainland in the form of a coalition of PPD and PSD parties 
in the regional governments. Greece did not become as decentralised over the same 
period of time. However, after the mid-1980s, under pressure to absorb funds from the 
Integrated Mediterranean Funds, the country was divided into thirteen regions with 
very slim regional administrations. In the 1990s more competences were transferred 
from the central administration to the regions as well as to the prefectures. 
 The second direction of the evolution of the state in Southern Europe at the 
closing of twentieth century followed the world-wide trend of state retrenchment, mostly 
through privatisations of parts of the public sector (Wright and Pagoulatos 2001: 234-
236). A related trend of the 1990s was the hesitant emergence of a regulatory type of 
state (Majone 1994), the success of which is still difficult to evaluate. The new 
regulatory role of the state is a world-wide phenomenon. In contrast to the post-war 
interventionist type of state, this end-of-the-century state was based on small new 
administrative units, functioning outside major ministries, and was oriented primarily 
towards setting the rules for private business and non-profit initiatives. Yet, in Southern 
Europe the ‘heavy’ traditional ministries were not dismantled. In the same vein, 
privatisations were wholeheartedly adopted in theory by successive South European 
governments, but in practice they were implemented to a very little extent until the 
beginning of the 1990s. In Greece, privatisations picked up only after the rise of Costas 
Simitis, the successor of Andreas Papandreou, to power (in 1996). In Italy, particularly 
in the second half of the 1990s, there was a pressure to trim the public sector by 
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getting rid of public monopolies (Lewanski 1999: 112). In Portugal, a large wave of 
privatisations occurred in 1989-1990 and again in 1995-1996. In Spain, privatisations 
picked up after 1993. Generally in the second half of the 1990s the size of South 
European public sector was somewhat altered, but the relevant process is still not over. 
On the other hand, the emergence of the new role of the state as a regulating agency is an 
unfinished process. Its results cannot yet be evaluated, as the process is linked to a third 
direction of change.  
The third direction of change was related to the effects of European integration 
on the organisation of South European bureaucracies. These were not limited to the push 
for decentralisation but appeared also at the level of central government. The EU offered 
externally induced pressure on the South European bureaucracies, but also became a 
source for inspiration for domestic pressures towards administrative reform: the 
modernizing political elites of Southern Europe used the prospect of integration into the 
EU as a political weapon to press for change in their states and societies. The case of 
Italy where technocratic elites played a pivotal role in the country’s monetary integration 
with the EU was typical in that respect (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). Generally, the 
effect of all this was the multiplication of administrative structures which appeared in 
various forms: first, in the form of new units (secretariats, divisions or sections of 
ministries) responsible for relations with the EU; second, in the form of task forces and 
ad hoc committees of experts entrusted with the tasks relevant to European integration; 
and third, in the form of new public agencies created on the side of ministries, in order to 
avoid the rigid hierarchy and cumbersome procedures of the central public 
administration. However, changes owed to Europeanization, without being cosmetic, 
have not been structural either. For instance, in Greece, the discrepancy between formal 
adaptation to EU rules and procedures, one the one hand, and informal practices, on the 
other, has been retained (Spanou 1998).This is not an idiosyncratic trait of contemporary 
Greece. The deviation of informal practices from formal arrangements is the 
consequence of the implementation of modern institutions in societies, which lagged 
behind in other, non-institutional aspects of modernity (e.g., in culture and social 
structure). Thus, the historical origins of bureaucracies have opened pathways for the 
organizational development of public administration and the wider public sector. This is 
an assumption derived from the theoretical framework of this paper, which is historical 
institutionalism. 
 
 
 
2. The sections of the paper 
 
All three directions of change in bureaucracies noted above emanate from the specific 
historical trajectory followed by South European states and societies. In the following 
section of the paper we will discuss the legitimacy of studying Southern Europe as a 
separate area, through a quick tour of the relevant literature. We will proceed to a 
presentation of the social and historical context in which South European bureaucracies 
developed. Further on, we will argue that owing to the particular development of social 
and class structure of South European societies, it is possible to identify the rise of a 
‘model’ or ‘family’ of South European state bureaucracies. The model has several real 
and persistent characteristics. These include formalism and legalism; extensive 
politicization of the top bureaucratic echelons (‘clientelism at the top’); extensive 
patronage in recruitment of low-ranking public sector personnel (‘clientelism at the 
bottom’); uneven development and unbalanced distribution of resources in the public 
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sector; and lack of an administrative elite in Greece, Italy and Portugal. By contrast, 
there are two stereotypical characteristics of the bureaucracies in Southern Europe, 
which stand in the crossroads between myth and reality. These are bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption. Switching our focus from cross-regional to intra-regional 
comparisons, we will very briefly note some differences among the four cases as well as 
a few variations among different sectors within each case. Finally, we will summarize 
our findings about the bureaucracies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, in the context 
of the parallel processes of democratisation, modernization and Europeanization. 
 
 
 
A. The study of democracy and bureaucracy in Southern Europe 
 
 
1. Brief survey of the literature 
 
Perhaps paradoxically, the comparative study of bureaucracy has been less advanced in 
European countries with a - more or less - negative reputation of bureaucratic 
performance, such as the countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). Comparative studies of models of government or traditions of governance 
usually do not include Southern Europe (e.g., Ziller 2001, Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 
2003).  The transformation of state bureaucracy in these four countries during the post-
authoritarian period has not been systematically studied, even though after the mid-
1970s the political science literature on Southern Europe burgeoned, focusing on  
successful transitions to democracy (e.g., Pridham 1984, O’Donnel, Schmitter and 
Whitehead 1986, Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros and Gunther 1988, Fishman 1990). 
The focus of this literature was on transitions from authoritarian rule and their external 
and domestic causes; on political elites and their role in the ensuing democratic 
consolidation; and on the evolution of political parties and parliaments. There was also a 
separate literature on the integration of three of the above countries, namely Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, into the European Union (e.e., Tsoukalis 1981, Seers and Vaitsos 
1982 for the European Economic Community, Featherstone and Kazamias 2001 for the 
EU). In almost all of the above research, the emphasis was put on the comparison of 
processes (transition, consolidation, integration) rather than structures, such as 
bureaucratic institutions and the state as a whole. Exceptions to this have been studies 
which look at the bureaucratic structures of Southern Europe indirectly, i.e., with regard 
to specific policy areas (e.g., Pridham 1996, Rhodes 1996, Bermeo 1999) or in relation 
to collective behaviour (Bermeo 1997,  Duran 2001).  
There are also particular public management reports on each one of the four 
countries (cf. various OECD studies since the mid-1960, as well as recent reports of 
OECD ’s ‘PUMA’ unit in www.oecd.org). There are also country-specific monographs 
on decision-making and the core executives (e.g., Gunther 1980 and Heywood 1999 on 
Spain, Hine 1993 on Italy, Sotiropoulos 2001 on Greece) and on the systems of public 
administration (e.g., Alvarez and Gonzalez-Haba 1992, Nieto 1993, Baena de Alcazar 
1993, and Crespo 2001 on Spain, Sotiropoulos 1996 and Spanou 2001 on Greece). 
While there are many such studies on the individual public administrative systems, there 
is a general understanding that the four cases share some empirical parallels or 
similarities (Goetz 2001: 1042-43).  
As far as the welfare state is concerned, there is an emerging consensus, that 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain belong to a distinct “family” or “world” of welfare 
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capitalism (Leibried 1992, Ferrera 1996, Rhodes 1996, Bonoli 1997, Arts and Gelissen 
2002) and cannot be classified into any of the three “worlds” described by Esping-
Andersen (1990). It is then plausible to hypothesize that the ‘southern model of welfare’ 
(Ferrera 1996) corresponds to a distinct set of  bureaucratic institutions and norms. The 
policy measures which have characterized the particular South European welfare model 
could probably have not emanated from a state apparatus organized to produce very 
different models of welfare, such as the social democratic, Scandinavian or the 
conservative-corporatist West European welfare model. Our hypothesis is that the South 
European model of welfare corresponds to a South European model of state 
bureaucracy. 
Research on non-compliance in the European Union (Börzel 2001: 818) shows 
that until the early 1990s Italy, Greece and Portugal led the other EU member-states in 
the share of formal letters from the Commission, reasoned opinions and referrals to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). It is possible to claim that there is no ‘Mediterranean 
syndrome’ (Börzel 2001: 820), since France and Belgium also belonged to the same 
group of laggards (behind the above three South European states), while Spain was close 
to the EU average. However, one cannot help noticing that in 1978-92 the 
aforementioned three South European states accounted for a little less than half of all 
referrals to the ECJ (with the addition of Spain, the share of Southern Europe surpassed 
55 per cent of all referrals; Börzel 2001: Table 4). It is reasonable to deduce that a 
particular model of public administration hides behind such a difficulty or reluctance to 
implement European law.  
 The same hypothesis may be derived from the - by now large - literature on the 
consolidation of democracy in Southern Europe (Pridham 1990 and 1991, Gunther, 
Diamandouros and Puhle 1995, Pridham and Lewis 1996, Linz and Stepan 1996, Ethier 
1997, Morlino 1998, Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). Assuming that “the sphere of 
modern public administration is an integral part of the consolidation of democracy” 
(Goetz 2001: 1033), we may claim that in the post-authoritarian period the state 
apparatus, which is inherited from the pre-democratic period, simultaneously constrains 
democratisation and is also affected by it. It is then plausible to hypothesize that the 
particular patterns of democratic consolidation which, according to most of the above 
literature, have set the South European cases apart from the cases of other Western 
democracies, correspond to a distinct type of state apparatus. The aim of this paper is to 
trace what, if any, patterns make South European state bureaucracies, including the 
central public administration and the public sector, distinct and different from the rest of 
the West European bureaucracies.  
 
 
2. Methodological and conceptual considerations 
 
The literature on Southern Europe, fuelled by the almost synchronized transition to 
democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s, has indicated that it is 
methodologically legitimate to study together the political and economic systems of 
these countries, including Italy. The legitimacy of this area study has been substantiated 
by several authors working in different scientific fields such as history (Malefakis 1995, 
Sapelli 1996), sociology (Giner 1985) and economics (Tsoukalis 1981, Gibson 2001) 
and coming from diverse theoretical perspectives such as the modernization approach 
(Linz 1979, Ziegenhagen and Koutsoukis 1992) and neo-marxist theory (Seers, Schaffer 
and Kiljunen 1979, Arrighi 1985, Hadjimichalis 1987, Vergopoulos 1990, Kurth and 
Petras 1993, Holman 1996).  
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Southern Europe offers an interesting area for study not because Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain are identical, but because these cases share enough historical 
similarities so as to make the contrast between them and the rest of West European cases 
fruitful. The four South European countries have followed more or less similar historical 
trajectories in terms of their socio-economic and political development (Malefakis 1995: 
36-44, Sapelli 1995: 5-20). For the purposes of this study, it would not be useful to 
include South European countries together with North European (Scandinavian) and 
other West European countries in a single group. Scandinavian and West European 
states have followed different historical trajectories in the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries. 
The methodological legitimacy of studying the four South European countries 
together was enhanced by political developments, common to all of them, in the late 
twentieth century. These included a break with the authoritarian past in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain in the mid-1970s, which was crucial for the onset of institutional 
modernization and Europeanization in South European states and societies. This is true, 
even though in all cases authoritarianism has probably left its mark on the distrustful 
relations between citizens and the public administration and on the limited autonomy of 
the administration from the political system.  
Around the same time (mid-1970s) the Italian conservative political class finally 
admitted the Communist Party (PCI) as a legitimate part of the political system and the 
post-war Italian democracy became fully consolidated (Morlino 1995: 376, Sani and 
Segatti 2001: 166). Later, in the 1980s all four countries were characterized by the 
comparatively strong presence of the Socialist and the Communist Left in their party 
systems and the corresponding presence of left-wing, often radical unions in their 
industrial relations systems. The place of such parties and unions along the political 
spectrum used to be to the Left of the typical social democratic or labour parties and 
unions of Northern or Western Europe. Other distinctive political patterns included the 
rise of majoritarian socialist or social democratic governments to power in the 1980s (or 
in coalition governments in Italy), whereas, by contrast, conservative parties were being 
returned to power in the rest of Western Europe; the permeation of many South 
European institutions by political parties; the importance of political symbols and 
traditional ideological cleavages in shaping electoral behaviour; and the polarized and 
partisan character of political culture at least until the mid-1980s, if not even later. 
 Finally, the last but not least commonality of political development of Southern 
Europe is the particular trajectory which the region’s welfare states have followed and 
which has lead to the provision of very fragmented, clientelist and uneven social 
protection. In view of the above, we would like to argue that the traditions of 
authoritarianism and political polarization, which have characterized Southern Europe, 
may be reflected in a particular ‘model’ or ‘family’ of state bureaucracies.  
What are the distinctive aspects of this ‘model’ or ‘family’? Our research design 
involves an examination of variables, i.e., of characteristics of South European state 
bureaucracies, including the central public administration and the public sector. We are 
going to registering the values of certain variables related to the organization and 
personnel of the bureaucracies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This may help us set 
South European bureaucracies apart from the rest of bureaucracies of Western and 
Northern Europe. These variables include the size of the state apparatus, including public 
spending and public employment; the extent of politicisation of the higher civil service; 
the patterns of personnel recruitment to the public sector; the internal distribution of 
resources in the public sector; the kind of implementation of norms and the character of 
legislative practices; and the availability of an administrative elite.  
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The variables are not random. They are related to a theoretical conception of the 
state in the analytical frameworks of organizational theory of the state and of historical 
institutionalism (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985 and Knocke and Laumann 
1987 on the organizational approach; Immergut 1998, Thelen 1999 and Peters 1999: 63-
77 on historical institutionalism). We take the state to be a relatively autonomous set of 
large modern formal organizations, standing at the intersection between society and the 
international geopolitical and economic environment (Skocpol 1985, Mann 1986, Perez-
Diaz 1998: 64). In our paper the state includes the central public administration and the 
wider public sector. Such an organizational approach to the state concentrates on the 
concepts of administrative structure, personnel recruitment and management, norms 
regulating organizational behaviour and functions of the bureaucracy. Obviously, the 
analysis of public administration and the wider public sector should be placed in the 
context of economy and society. In our case, this context consists of the economic, 
political and social systems of Southern Europe in the late twentieth century. While it 
may be the case that, as the twentieth century drove to its close, South European 
economies and societies gradually converged with the rest of Western Europe (Giner 
1985: 346, Maravall 1993: 122-124, Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995), at the 
same time, the region’s state bureaucracies until recently retained many of their 
traditional features. The latter have started changing under the twin influence of 
democratization and Europeanization. 
This exercise is not meant to evaluate the four South European cases negatively 
in comparison with the rest of  West European cases. Nor is it meant to imply that there 
is a solid Western model of state administration, which the four aforementioned 
countries have to imitate. State failure occurs also in the West and the North of Europe. 
For instance, there are many disagreeable aspects in the functioning of presumably more 
advanced Western bureaucracies. Such aspects include red tape, inertia, police 
surveillance, insensitivity to minorities and to socially excluded categories of the 
population as well as a ‘race to the bottom’ in the state provision of certain welfare 
services. South European bureaucracies did not differ from West European ones in these 
symptoms, but rather in their historical origins and current structural characteristics to 
which we now turn. 
 
 
 
B. State and society in Southern Europe 
 
In this section, in order to trace the origins of South European bureaucracies, we refer 
to the particular socio-economic role played by the state in society in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. We underline the priorities of  transition to democracy and to 
the simultaneous more recent challenges faced by South European states in the last 
decades of the twentieth century.  
 
 
1. The social structure of South European societies and the state 
 
The social structure of South European societies bears certain similarities with that of 
other advanced industrial societies. However, South European societies have certain 
distinguishing traits. These traits are linked to the comparatively large agricultural 
economy in the countryside; extended petty commodity production; and self-
employment in a concomitant service sector in the cities (Giner 1986: 310-312, 
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Petmesidou 1996: 95 and 98). Corresponding to that economic structure, in Southern 
Europe there are the following social strata:  a still comparatively sizeable agricultural 
class, consisting of independent, small-holding farmers; a working class which, owing to 
de-industrialization, has rapidly shrunken; an enduring old middle class (‘petite 
bourgeoisie’); a well organized and mobilized stratum of public sector employees; a 
politically strong stratum of urban liberal professionals (lawyers, doctors, engineers); 
and a state-dependent capitalist class, made up of industrialists, bankers, land owners, 
ship owners, financiers, mass media businessmen and public works contractors who 
have often relied on state loans, contracts and other outlays to sustain their share of the 
market.  
The fact that bureaucratic institutions are embedded in societies means that we 
cannot explain how the South European model of bureaucracy has arisen without 
reference to South European state-society relations. Obviously, Southern Europe 
shares West European traditions. West and South European states have been 
developmentalist, in the sense that they have steered economic development for many 
decades and particularly since the end of the Second World War.1 However, it has 
been argued that the state in Southern Europe has “assisted” the development of 
capitalism for a longer time and to an extent larger than states in other European 
capitalist economies. The “assisted capitalism” of Southern Europe is contrasted to 
the more “competitive capitalism” of the capitalist core economies of Western Europe 
(Giner 1985: 291, 318 and 338, Vasquez-Barquero and Hebbert 1985: 291, Maravall 
1993: 79). In terms of social structure, which is the focus of this section, we may 
hypothesize that “assisted capitalism” may differ from “competitive capitalism” 
because the former has lower levels of social capital and trust than the latter.2  
On the other hand, Southern Europe is neither halfway between Western 
Europe and the Third World nor is “assisted capitalist development” the same as 
“dependent development”. The latter underlines economic dependence on foreign 
capital rather than on the state and has falsely been associated by earlier analysts with 
the development of Southern Europe (Seers, Schaffer and Kiljunen 1979, Arrighi 
1985). The “dependista” perspective may have been useful in the past. It is not 
relevant to study of the 1980s and the 1990s, i.e., the time frame of this paper. Even 
earlier in the twentieth century, capitalism in Southern Europe did not look like 
capitalism in the Third World or the “periphery” (or even the “semi-periphery”) of 
capitalism, where notions of “dependent development” apply. Over the last quarter of 
the twentieth century, if not earlier, Southern Europe has shifted to the “core” (Giner 
1985: 339).  
The state in Southern Europe has traditionally promoted economic 
development through patronage of  certain industrial sectors and business interests. 
The traditional economic role of the state in South European societies involved 
protectionism, autarky, transfers and subsidies to and control of specific industries. 
All these constituted an array of strategies and instruments which have been employed 
to promote economic development since the nineteenth century. In the past, such 
strategies and instruments of development were well known to other states in Western 
Europe where there was “competitive” rather than “assisted” capitalism. In Southern 
Europe the difference was that such strategies and instruments were used in a very 
particularistic, if not personalistic fashion. The principal benefactors of this role of the 
state in society were the extended families of large landowners, industrialists and 
                                                 
1 I thank George Pagoulatos for this point. 
2 I thank Christos J. Paraskevopoulos for this point. 
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bankers who constituted the core of South European capitalist class. They became 
accustomed to depend on the state for their enrichment and for the reproduction of 
their power position in society. This has led to growth, but not necessarily to 
development. Uneven economic development and capitalist mis-growth ensued in 
Southern Europe. 
In the same vein, it can be argued that South European states are more class-
biased than other states functioning in capitalism, such as West European or North 
European ones. However, the class bias of South European states does not adhere to the 
traditional Marxist approach of the capitalist state. The South European class bias has 
been at the same time narrower, benefiting a closely knit capitalist class, and more wide, 
promoting various middle- and upper-middle class interests. The role of the state in 
society and particularly in conflict-ridden societies, such as those of Southern Europe, is 
not neutral towards particular social interests. This does not mean that, in an abstract 
sense, the state is always bound to promote only the same aforementioned social class 
interests. In addition to the cleavage between the capitalist class, on the one hand, and 
the middle and lower social classes, on the other, there are more social cleavages, which 
may in fact have been shaped by the state itself through its social welfare policies. 
Typical examples with particular reference to Southern Europe are the cleavage between 
self-employment and paid employment (the salaried strata); as well as the gender gap 
and the cleavage between native citizens and foreign migrants, to which we will return 
later. 
In sum, the state has had the opportunity to promote a set of different vested 
interests. These have not exclusively been the interests of the capitalist class, although 
this class has clearly benefited the most from the manner the state developed in the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Liberal professionals, segments of the petite 
bourgeoisie and public sector employees have obtained and defended various privileges, 
usually at the expense of small farmers, workers and private sector employees. Nowhere 
has this been more evident than in the sector of welfare. 
 
 
2. A particular model of social welfare  
 
Research has shown that Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain can be studied together in 
terms of social protection. Traditionally in Southern Europe social protection was 
offered by the family, the Church and voluntary associations practicing philanthropy. 
In parallel, the welfare state developed somewhat slowly during the second half of the 
twentieth century and more rapidly after the transition from authoritarian rule. As 
noted above, it is now accepted that the four countries under study constitute the 
South European model of welfare state (Ferrera 1996: 29-30, Rhodes 1996, 
Matsaganis 1999). As Table I shows, in the late 1990s South European welfare states 
performed differently from the rest of EU welfare states. The former were less 
generous in social spending and less effective in preventing income inequalities and in 
curbing poverty.  
The South European model involves generosity of the state towards certain 
population categories combined with indifference towards other ones; universalistic 
provision of public health service, albeit with uneven quality; a mix of public and 
privately-funded, occupationally-based social insurance schemes; selective provision of 
cash subsidies by the state, sometimes on the basis of patronage; less-than-transparent 
financing of the system both from public finances and work-related contributions; and, 
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until the 1990s, lack of a minimum social protection, offered by the state, to which every 
citizen would be entitled.  
The existence of a particular South European model of welfare should be 
accounted for by the distinct role of the South European states. Historically, capitalism in 
Southern Europe has been associated with the following pattern: revenue has been 
appropriated by the state and distributed to social classes linked to and dependent on the 
state.3 Appropriation and distribution of revenue have been particularistic and less than 
transparent. Distributional particularism has favoured some social strata, namely the 
business class, the liberal professions and segments of the petite bourgeoisie (such as 
farmers receiving extensive subsidies). These strata have systematically avoided to 
contribute to the public finances at a level corresponding to their share of income and 
wealth. Large and small businessmen, doctors, lawyers and engineers have ‘excelled’ in 
tax evasion. The same strata have put together their own social security schemes, which 
are partly financed by the state. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Selected indicators of South European welfare states 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Greece  Italy Portugal Spain  EU-15 
 
Social expenditure  
(% of GDP),  
in 1999  25.5 %  25.3% 22.9%  20.0%  27.6 % 
 
Poverty before  
social transfers,  
in 1998  23 %  23% 27%  25%  26 % 
 
Poverty after social  
transfers, in 1998 22 %  20% 20%  19%  18% 
 
Distribution of  
income (S80/S20), 
 in 1998  6.5  5.9 7.2  6.8  5.4 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Matsaganis, Ferrera, Capucha and Moreno (2003): 641, Table 1, based on 
Commission of the European Communities (2002), The Social Situation in the 
European Union, Luxembourg: Office of the Official Publications of the EC. 
‘S80/S20’ denotes the ratio of income earned by the top quintile over the bottom 
quintile. Social expenditure data are drawn on the basis of ESSPROS system of social 
protection statistics, not on national social budgets. 
 
                                                 
3 I thank Maria Petmesidou for bringing up and underlying the importance of this point. 
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 The result was that the aforementioned strata have appropriated a comparatively 
large share of funds allocated to social protection. In other words, their earnings from the 
social security system have been incommensurate to their contributions to it. This has 
particularly been the case of liberal professionals. By contrast, other strata, such as 
dependent labour (wage and salary earners) have been unable to elicit the same response 
from the state, with the exception of certain well-organized and mobilized employees of 
public corporations. The salaried strata have had to rely on ill-financed social security, 
public health and social assistance schemes, offering inadequate social transfers and poor 
quality of services. The relations between business and autonomous employees on the 
one hand and wage and salary earners, on the other, have been very unequal. The 
salaried strata have partly financed the welfare of the former through taxation and social 
security contributions. 
 
 
3. Gender, migration and the state in Southern Europe 
 
In addition to its role as assistant to the development of upper class interests 
(particularly the interests of businessmen and liberal professional), the state in 
Southern Europe has actively influenced gender relations and relations between the 
native citizens and incoming migrants. In both these policy areas, the state in 
Southern Europe has functioned in a fashion which sets it apart from the rest of West 
European states. 
 With regard to gender issues, the state in Southern Europe displays a 
formalistic distance between a universalistic and even progressive legal framework, 
on the one hand, and actual performance and policy implementation, on the other. At 
the face of it, South European countries do not lag behind their West European 
counterparts in terms of establishing social rights. Generally, in terms of new 
legislation, these states have slowly followed EU patterns. On that count, Spain, for 
instance, has been neither a laggard nor a fully compliant state (Threlfall 1997). 
 Nor can it be sustained that in terms of gender composition, the state 
apparatuses of Southern Europe are male-dominated. While Greek, Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish political careers are still far more easily accessed by men than by women, 
a civil service career seems to be a less gender-biased option. As Table 2 shows, in 
comparative terms, the share of female senior managers among all managers in South 
European bureaucracies is not significantly lower than the equivalent figure for 
Western Europe. 
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TABLE 2 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Share of women among senior managers of the central governments in Western and 
Southern Europe in 1998 (%) 
 
Western Europe: 
France    53.5 
Germany   14.3 
Ireland    13.3 
Netherlands   18.0 
West European  
average   24.8 
 
Southern Europe: 
Greece    30.1 
Italy    12.0 
Portugal   25.7 
South European  
average   22.6 
 
Source: Averages elaborated on the basis of OECD Public Management Service 2001, 
available in www.oecd.org. There is no data for Spain, the U.K. or any of the North 
European (Scandinavian) countries. 
 
And yet Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are distinctly ‘women-unfriendly welfare 
states’ (Gonzalez, Jurado and Naldini 1999: 25). South European states have 
benefited from, if not outwardly promoted, the continuing importance of the family as 
a fall-back institution for Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish children, for 
adolescents just out of school or out of work, for sick family members, for the 
disabled and the elderly. South European welfare states have a pension-heavy 
character. As a result, welfare spending in areas other than pensions is slim.4  
This is evident in many areas. For instance, all four states have put together 
comparatively meagre social assistance systems (Gough 1996). Until the late 1990s in 
South European countries  (with the exception of Spain) there was no minimum 
income guarantee, i.e., no safety net (Greece has yet to install such a net).  Social 
assistance, non-contributory pensions, i.e., pensions handed out to individuals with no 
social insurance contributions, and minimum social security pensions are still very 
low. The majority of South Europeans who receive such pensions are women. Their 
fate is contrasted to that of the typical South European male-breadwinner who often 
receives a more substantial pension. There is a gender gap also in unemployment 
benefits. In comparison with West European standards, child benefits for couples with 
children are small. Most importantly, compared to West European social services, in 
Southern Europe there are few or inadequate child care services and services for the 
elderly (Gonzalez, Jurado and Naldini 1999: 27). 
 How is the above discrepancy between recognized social rights and actual 
policies to be explained? It seems that the state in Southern Europe works on the basis 
                                                 
4 I thank Dimitris Papadimitriou and Manos Matsaganis for insisting on this point. 
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of two principles. The first is that women are expected to receive financial aid from 
their husbands or fathers rather than from the state. In other words, the South 
European welfare state is organized primarily to serve the - usually - male head of 
household. This occurs in Southern Europe more than in Western or Northern Europe, 
where traditional family-centered households have begun to disintegrate. The second 
is a particular subsidiarity principle. ‘According to this principle, it is first the family 
that has a duty to provide for a dependent family member. The state has an obligation 
to intervene only as a second resort and in the case of the failure of the family’ (ibid). 
Family care in the societies of Southern Europe where, compared to Western Europe, 
women have still not been fully integrated into the labour market, has a particular 
meaning: it means care by the female members of the household. Upper middle and 
upper class families may be able to draw on outside help, employing, for instance, 
immigrant women as child minders and carers of the elderly. This is common 
everywhere, but in Southern Europe the few or inadequate public care services add to 
the acuteness of social inequality. The state, being reluctant to offer full coverage in 
the area of social care, reproduces the social class discrepancy between families 
which can afford private child and elderly care and the rest which have to count on the 
rudimentary social care services. 
 A similar discrepancy, a gap in implementation, has been observed with 
regard to migration into Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Baldwin-Edwards 1999: 
11). Formulating a migration policy has been a recent challenge for South European 
states, which at least since the late 1980s have witnessed waves of migrants from 
North Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Near East and South Asia. Southern 
Europe has been a gateway for migrants from less developed areas of the world to the 
West. In particular, it has been an ‘entrance hall to the EU’ (Anthias and Lazaridis 
1999: 3). Initially, South European states and societies were not prepared for this 
challenge. Relations between native citizens and migrants and the status of migrants 
were left outside the scope of public policy until this ‘laissez faire approach’ (ibid) 
could not any more cope with the size of the phenomenon.  Slowly new policies were 
adopted. In the four South European countries, the introduction of asylum, 
immigration and regularization laws was accelerated in 1990-93 and 1995-98 
(Baldwin-Edwards 1999: 9). The Shengen agreement channelled national legislation 
towards the adoption of more restrictive measures.  
However, the initial state response, which was to neglect the problem and to 
pass the onerous task of dealing with migrants to the private sector, still determines 
the condition of migrants in Southern Europe. Large numbers of migrants remain 
unaccounted for; employers hire them in the underground economy, on much lower 
wages than native workers and often without fulfilling any social insurance 
obligations. Overall, despite gradual regularization of the status of migrants, the 
response of South European states has been slow and reactive rather than proactive. 
Civil servants and experts seemed to have played a much greater role than usual, in 
shaping relevant policies (Baldwin-Edwards 1999: 12).   
 In short, a further social role of the state in Southern Europe entails something 
more than the reproduction of social class inequalities. It includes structuring gender 
roles in line with traditional male-dominated family patterns and responding to the 
challenge of immigration first in a belated, if not ad hoc fashion and then in a 
restrictive manner, following wider EU patterns. The general failure of South 
European states to respond effectively to the challenge of migration may be linked to 
their inability or rather their reluctance to monitor large and small business interests. 
As South European businessmen and liberal professionals have been under-taxed, so 
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their hiring practices among foreign migrants have gone unchecked. The same holds 
true for unchecked gross wage discrepancies between men and women working in 
salaried (paid) employment. In jobs dominated by women, such as domestic 
employment, wages are low and social insurance meagre, if available. In other words, 
also in its migration and gender policies the states of  Southern Europe have replicated 
their biased role in favour of the more powerful social strata mentioned above. 
 The above economic and social roles of the state in Southern Europe are 
closely linked to its distinct organizational traits, outlined later in this paper. These 
specific traits are owed to a large extent to the particular roles played by the state. 
More concretely, the large number and fragmentation of upper and middle class 
interest groups with their tailor-made access to the state have left their mark in the 
plethora and rigid nature of legislation. In Southern Europe, universalistic regulations 
are only formally adhered to. In practice, there are numerous exceptions to every rule, 
in order to accommodate the aforementioned powerful interests. This results in the 
over-production and rigidity of regulations. Conversely, less powerful social 
categories, such as women and foreign migrants, may not be covered by the existing 
legislation. The increasing entrance of women in the labour market in the late 
twentieth century and the influx of foreign migrants particularly in the 1980s and the 
1990s have caught South European bureaucracies off guard. These bureaucracies, 
when they do not openly discriminate against powerless groups, respond to challenges 
rather belatedly and in a reactive fashion. 
 On the other hand, the long-term dependence of the South European capitalist 
class and the liberal professions on the state has increased the importance of 
controlling the state apparatus. Business interests have indirect ways of exercising 
political influence (e.g., through financing the campaigns of certain politicians or 
posing the threat of capital flight). Other social interests are directly represented at the 
centres of decision-making in a disproportional fashion. Research on ministerial and 
parliamentary elites in Southern Europe has shown the over-representation of lawyers  
and other liberal professionals in successive governments and parliaments in all four 
countries under study (Tavares de Almeida, Costa Pinto and Bermeo 2003).  
Even in the current period of state retreat, in societies of ‘assisted capitalism’ 
the penultimate question is who controls the state. This is reflected in the relative lack 
of autonomy of the administrative from the political systems of Southern Europe. In 
that area of the world, the last thing business and liberal professional interests would 
like to see, would be a state apparatus autonomous from political power, let alone a 
strong administrative elite.  
If a high quality administrative elite, independent of the political class, ever 
rose in Greece, Italy and Portugal, then the personal and collective privileges (such as 
low-interest loans, licences, etc.) granted periodically to members and sections of the 
interests mentioned above would run the risk of being reviewed on a non-
particularistic basis. As long as the state apparatus is closely monitored by political 
power and as long as the latter is influenced through selective financial contributions 
of big businesses to political parties and through the over-representation of liberal 
professionals among parliamentarians and Cabinet ministers, the ‘model’ sketched 
further below in this paper will survive. Clientelism ‘at the top’ and ‘from below’, 
uneven distribution of resources in the public sector, fragmentation, rigidity and over-
production of legislation and lack of administrative elites will continue to characterize 
South European bureaucracies. Conversely, as long as the patronage-based political 
participation of members of lower social strata in the political systems of Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain continues, reform of the administrative systems in a non-
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clientelistic manner will have to wait. Clientelism has been a long-term trait of the 
‘model’ of South European bureaucracy and may be here to stay.  
 
 
4. Clientelism as a mentality and a principle of social organization 
 
By clientelism, we mean ‘a particular mode of social and especially political 
organisation, whose typical structural element and characteristic building block is the 
patron-client dyad’ (Mavrogordatos 1983: 5). Political clientelism can also be seen as a 
mode of political participation of the masses in politics (Lyrintzis 1983). The patron-
client relationship is dyadic and personal, contractual and achieved, informal, 
fundamentally instrumental for both sides of the relationship, reciprocal, but also 
asymmetrical and vertical, in the sense that the client depends on the patron 
(Mavrogordatos 1983:6). This definition refers to the individual level of analysis. For  
the societal level, it is useful to turn to Luigi Graziano (1978: 297): ‘Clientelism may 
take one of two forms: the “privatisation” of politics or the “colonization” of civil 
society. Politics is “privatised” when groups have direct, unmediated access to political 
authority, which they treat as a tool for their private aims. “Colonization of society” is 
the opposite process. It occurs when formerly autonomous social institutions come to be 
regulated by the parties in power’. 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, in Southern Europe, the old 
person-to-person clientelism was probably replaced by party-led clientelism. The latter 
has assumed a more organised form and is engineered by party organisations, but its 
extent is debated (e.g., Lyrintzis 1984, Spanou 1996 and Mavrogordatos 1997 on 
Greece; Chubb 1982 and Caciagli and Kawata 2001 on Italy; Farelo Lopes 1997 on 
Portugal; Cazorla 1992 on Spain. Hopkin 2001 is critical of the explanatory value of 
clientelism). 
Except for supporting a state-dependent business elite (consisting of private 
entrepreneurs subsidized and otherwise supported by the state) and actively reproducing 
social class and gender inequalities through its welfare model, the state in Southern 
Europe has traditionally upheld clientelism as an organizing principle. The same 
principle has been applied in encounters between individual citizens and the public 
administration (individual level of analysis) and in the interaction between the 
government and various social categories of the population (collective level of analysis). 
Clientelism is not an ingrained racial, tribal or regional characteristic of South 
Europeans. The roots of clientelism are historical and its perseverance has to do with the 
particular economic and political functions it has served.  
Nevertheless, clientelism has by now become a mentality of South Europeans, 
i.e., a mental reflex, whenever they come in any kind of contact with state authorities. 
This means a tendency to think in terms of political connections and “plugs” in order to 
bring any business, however small, with the state to a successful end. Such a mentality 
refers to individual patron-client relations. However, this mentality alone would not have 
been enough to sustain clientelistic arrangements for long at the wider societal level. 
Rather, at that level clientelism has become a major structural characteristic which, as we 
will claim, has set the South European ‘model’ or ‘family’ of bureaucracy apart from its 
West and North European counterparts.   
Deeply seated clientelism has not left room for universalistic, modernizing 
reform of state administration.  Not even strong pressures, such as those exerted by 
Europeanization, have been able to dramatically alter the main characteristics of the 
South European ‘model’ of bureaucracy. Too many vested interests have been 
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accommodated by the aforementioned clientelistic arrangements to tolerate any attempts 
by modernizing governing elites or expert groups of reformers to do otherwise. The 
clientelistic mentality is difficult to uproot. In addition, there has not been any persistent, 
wide social mobilization from below to alter the clientelistic nature of South European 
state bureaucracies. This is related to the fact that the way the state in Southern Europe is 
organized has proven beneficial to more people than the usual state-dependent business 
entrepreneurs and to wider social strata than the capitalist class. 
Which are these social strata? Clientelism constitutes an element of  a ‘complex 
and distinctive mode of income generation and distribution of [South European] 
societies’ (Petmesidou 1996: 96). It is a principle of social organization with a primary 
economic function, which, nevertheless, has political implications. What is this 
economic function? In Southern Europe masses of unemployed or unemployable urban 
dwellers have obtained permanent or temporary jobs in the public sector through 
clientelism. One of the unintended consequences has been that the state has prevented 
the emergence of a large working class in the private sector, which could have mobilized 
to compromise the allied interests of the business elite, the liberal professions and the 
political class.   
Income has thus been generated in the form of salaries as well as in the form of 
welfare transfers to particular, comparatively privileged socio-professional categories of 
the population. Many of these categories are linked to the state apparatus. Typical 
examples include employees of public corporations, professional military personnel and 
judges. A cleavage between public employees on the one side and private employees and 
workers on the other exists. The latter are subjected not only to job insecurity but also 
often to comparatively worse working conditions and lower pensions and social 
assistance benefits (Ferrera 1996). Normally in Southern Europe the trade unions of the 
private sector are much weaker than many unions of the public sector which have been 
able to obtain more beneficial social security and health insurance schemes.  
Secondly, clientelism has a more straightforward political function too. It can be 
understood as a mode of political participation (Mouzelis 1986: 74, 76-77, 132-33). 
Under clientelism, the various segments of society are not incorporated into the political 
system in the form of interest groups, which enjoy a relative autonomy from the state. 
This has probably been the mode of political incorporation of the masses in various West 
European parliamentary democracies where civil society has generally been strong. By 
contrast in Southern Europe, where civil society has been relatively weak, lower and 
middle social strata have been brought into politics through various ‘vertical networks of 
patron-client relationships’ (ibid: 76).  
This general pattern reflects the balance of power between social classes. The 
upper and upper-middle classes of South European societies, including businessmen and 
liberal professionals, have sought to protect their hegemony by using the state apparatus. 
A typical example is the case of post-war Italy where landed and industrial elites used 
the vehicle of the Christian Democratic party (DC) to exclude the middle and lower 
strata from power. The party controlled the bureaucracy and established its social base 
through clientelistic appointments of party supporters from among the middle and lower 
classes to the public sector as well as through party-led voluntary associations (e.g., 
party-dominated trade unions). The same clientelistic logic applied to the selective 
provision of subsidies to Italian private firms and businessmen (Shefter 1977: 444-45).   
If the above aspects of clientelism, as mentality and principle of social 
organization, go some way towards explaining its historical endurance, what explains its 
continuity and persistence even in the late twentieth century? The answer may lie in the 
initial requirements and priorities of transition to democracy and in the multiple 
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challenges which South European states faced in the more recent stages of democratic 
consolidation. 
 
 
5. South European state bureaucracies during democratisation 
 
The bureaucracies which had served the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe 
could have been major obstacles to democratisation. In reality, they were not. The 
reasons were different among the four cases under study. In Spain, bureaucrats were 
somewhat insulated from the control of Falangist cadres. Since the late 1950s, 
bureaucrats had achieved a ‘relative autonomy’ from the Francoist state. In 1975-
1977, regime change was to an extent engineered by such relatively autonomous 
bureaucrats. Bitter memories of the Spanish Civil War meant that all involved were 
very cautious during the delicate period of the transition. The traditional 
professionalism of the Spanish civil service corps also helped. The authoritarian 
regime had nurtured competent officials who masterminded the transition. 
The case of Portugal was probably diametrical to that of Spain. Bureaucrats 
had identified a lot with the regime of Salazar and Caetano. The type of democratic 
transition, i.e., the collapse of the authoritarian regime, was sudden enough not to 
allow for the protracted evolution noticed in the Spanish case. Purges of bureaucrats 
followed in the wake of the installation of left-wing governments supported by the 
mobilisation of left-wing workers, farmers and students. In Portugal the identification 
of the bureaucracy with the deposed regime required such purges, which, however, 
contributed to the political instability that for a while made the Portuguese transition 
unpredictable.  
The Greek and the Italian cases seemed to be somewhat in between the above 
two extremes. In Greece, there were some, but in fact limited, purges (Psomiades 
1982). The military junta did not have the time to institutionalise itself, while the 
bureaucrats had not fully espoused the purposes of the seven-year long dictatorship. 
In Italy after 1943, pro-fascist officials were allowed to fade away.5 The ‘cleansing’ 
of bureaucratic ranks was not a top priority, since the main problem for the new ruling 
elites was how to contain the Italian Left.  
We may deduce that general administrative reform was not a main priority. 
Preoccupation with more pressing problems of transition has not allowed post-
authoritarian governments to reform the administrative systems. Governmental, 
parliamentary and judicial institutions have been substantively reformed since the re-
instauration of democracy in Southern Europe. Bureaucratic institutions have not been 
subjected to equally satisfactory reform. Stereotypical perceptions about their 
inefficiency and corruption were not altered dramatically in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century (and in the last fifty years in the case of Italy). Democratisation has 
not effaced the rest of the long-term traits of South European bureaucracies either.  
 
 
6. The precipitation of simultaneous challenges 
 
Still, why are some traditional aspects of South European bureaucracies perpetuated 
to a certain extent even today, i.e. long into the phase of democratic consolidation or 
in fact after its completion? We suggest that possible reasons may be the following: 
                                                 
5 I wish to thank Gianfranco Pasquino for contributing this point. 
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At the end of the twentieth century, South European democracies, had both to face old 
problems, the solution to which had been awaited for a long time by their citizens 
(e.g., to build accountable, transparent and meritocratic bureaucracies), and to meet 
new challenges. There was a precipitation of simultaneous challenges overtaxing the 
state apparatuses of the area. 
Other modern bureaucracies, particularly those of Western Europe, had first 
become modern and, with the exception of the inter-war period, were accustomed to 
function within democratic regimes. Later, in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
West European bureaucracies embarked on a process of adaptation to the diffusion of 
new technologies and the intensification of international economic competition. South 
European bureaucracies did not have the time to proceed in the same manner, i.e., 
meeting the aforementioned successive problems and challenges in a stepwise fashion. 
In contrast with their West European counterparts, the bureaucracies of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain were pressed to take all relevant steps simultaneously, i.e., organisational 
modernisation, democratisation, adaptation to new technologies and methods of 
management, including ideas of New Public Management, and orientation to the 
European integration and to the new competitive international environment. The state 
apparatuses of Greece, Portugal and Spain were put to the above imminent tasks all of 
which surfaced more or less at the same time.  
Italy was and still is much different, because its post-war democratic regime was 
established much earlier than in the other three cases. Yet, Italy too has not been able to 
build a bureaucracy which would function like the North or West European ones. This is 
due to the inertia, if not the resistance, of the Italian civil service, among other reasons 
(Cassese 1984). Political clientelism in Italy was not dissimilar with the equivalent forms 
of state-citizen relations witnessed in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Finally, the Italian 
state functioned for a long time as a 'social shock absorber' (Spence 2000: 135), 
employing people who could not or would not find a job in the labour market. This was 
a function all too familiar in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the late twentieth century.  
To sum up this section, our argument has been that long-term historical trends 
and specific political and economic functions of the state in Southern Europe have 
created a social context, which was conducive to the emergence of a distinct model of 
bureaucracy in that area of Europe. The trends and functions include the active shaping 
of social class, professional and gender inequalities by the state and the reproduction of 
patron-client relations both at the individual and the collective level. The structural 
characteristics of the South European model, which we proceed to examine below, may 
be understood as consequences of the above trends and functions. 
  
 
 
C. A Southern-European traditional ‘model’ or ‘family’ of state bureaucracies? 
 
 
1. Norms and legislative practices: Formalism, over-production of norms and 
legalistic rigidity 
 
All administrative actions of modern state bureaucracies are bound by the principle of 
legality. Bureaucracies are not free to do as they please. They may engage only in 
those actions which are described in advance by law. This principle is applied in 
South European states in an excessive and fragmented manner which has led to an 
over-production of laws and decrees. Regulatory over-production is linked with 
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legalism, the tendency to view things through the lens of provisions of law and to 
address all new political and social problems by resorting to the passage of new 
legislation or amendments to existing one. Legalism, in turn, is probably associated with 
compartmentalisation of regulations and with formalism, i.e., with a larger than usual 
discrepancy between what the law stipulates and what really happens. 
In the previous two centuries, the formal structure of the state bureaucracies of 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain was not considerably different from that of their North 
and West European counterparts. In other words, official bureaucratic norms were not 
different in Southern Europe from the rest of Europe. All four bureaucracies were built 
in the nineteenth century along the lines of the master-plan of Napoleonic administration 
and continental European administrative law (e.g., Beltran 1988 on the case of Spain). 
The formal, Napoleonic-type similarities in terms of organization of the legal system and 
bureaucratic structure between North, West and South European bureaucracies did not 
over-shadow certain subterranean, substantive politico-administrative traits which were 
typical of Southern Europe.  
An example was the discrepancy between legal provision and eventual outcome 
which did not simply reflect the problems of implementation faced by every modern 
state. In Southern Europe, the discrepancy was to a certain extent the result of the 
superimposition of modern political and administrative institutions on pre-modern 
societies and of the informal workings of all sorts of interests, related to social class 
conflicts, localism, regional identities and even organised crime (in a few regions). As a 
result, in various policy areas and with a lot of differentiation from one region to another, 
the state in Southern Europe was permeated by all those interests and functioned in a 
particularistic and clientelistic manner.  
Except from formalism and legalism, over-production of norms seems to have 
taken place in Southern Europe to an extent larger than in Western or Northern Europe. 
A relevant example is the size and the type of legal framework with which the civil 
service in South European countries still operates. Generally, numerous, often 
contradictory laws passed by parliament, presidential decrees, and ministerial ordinances 
form the ‘legal orders’ of Greece and Italy. Estimations of the laws enacted in Italy by 
the beginning of the 1990s vary between 100,000 and 200,000 (Cassesse 1993a: 318, 
Della Cananea 1995: 23). In Greece, between 1989 and 1996, 5,286 laws were passed 
(Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 15 August 1999). Obviously, the application of laws 
requires issuing further decrees and ordinances, which amounts to still further increases 
in formality and rigidity.  
  This tendency towards establishing detailed, formal regulations is 
accompanied by a desire to satisfy small sectoral interests through the passage of 
convenient legislation. Laws and decrees accommodate such interests but, as a 
consequence, also subject equivalent interests to unequal treatment. Examples include 
state-subsidized business companies, local networks of politicians, civil servants and 
businessmen as well as trade unions of the wider public sector. Some of these 
collective actors have succeeded in carving out a particularistic legal framework, 
suitable to their sectoral interests, thus adding up to the plethora of regulations and the 
contradictions of legislation. 
The result is a plethoric, formal and inflexible legal framework which has 
provoked the rise of informal arrangements, side-stepping the law. Such arrangements 
have arisen as a matter-of-fact. The reason has been the large quantity and rapid 
changes in the production of legislation. Such frequent and cumulative changes have 
resulted in social relations being regulated in a detailed and rigid manner. In the 
meantime, administrative procedures have become long and complex. As De Sousa 
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Santos explains about the Portuguese state: '...the Portuguese state is an informal state, 
a state in which hyper-formalisation breaks into available informality. In a sense, 
there is an unofficial state that acts in parallel to the official state' (De Sousa Santos 
1986: 188). Also in Greece, there have been multiple, frequently changing regulations 
of the status of civil servants and their recruitment and career patterns. Such 
regulations have varied widely within the confines of one and the same civil service. 
Generally in Southern Europe the implementation of regulations of the civil service 
status has been selective and complementary to informal practices. Such practices 
have varied according to the traditions of individual ministries or departments (e.g., in 
Greece) and corps of civil servants (e.g., in Spain) and to rapidly changing 
administrative policies of incoming governments. Despite repeated announcements of 
and attempts at reform, the administrative systems of Southern Europe have remained 
formal and rigid.  
 
 
2. The size of bureaucracy 
 
There is an impression that, due to clientelism, South European bureaucracies are 
excessively large. In gerneral, there are several ways to measure the size of states: size of 
public expenditure; size of government revenue; and size of public employment. Tables 
3,4,5 and 6 below show that South European states used to and to an extent still are 
smaller than their North or West European counterparts. Over time, however, there has 
been a convergence, at least in terms of size, between South, West and North European 
states. We first look at expenditure (Tables 3-4) and then at revenue (Tables 5-6). 
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we see that overall in 1960-1982 South European 
states had lower levels of public expenditure than West European and much lower 
levels than North European states. All three groups of countries raised more or less 
equally their public expenditure as a share of GNP. North European states spent 
comparatively more funds (Table 3). In 1980-1995, South European states intensified 
their efforts to increase public spending and did so more than North European states. 
At the same time, West European states kept their expenditure levels stable (with the 
exception of France which followed the South European pattern, as Table 4 shows.) 
As a result, by 1995 the expenditure levels (as a share of GDP) of South, North and 
West European states had converged. 
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TABLE  3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Total public expenditure in Southern, Western, and Northern Europe between 1960 and 
1982 (as percentage of GNP) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    1960  1982  Change 1982/60 
    
Southern Europe:  
Greece    17.4  37.0   + 19.6  
Italy    30.1  53.7   + 23.6 
Portugal   17.0  42.7   + 25.7 
Spain     18.8  34.1   + 15.3 
South European  
average   20.8  41.9   + 21.1  
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium   28.9  45.8   + 16.9 
France    34.6  50.7   + 16.1 
Germany   32.5  49.4   + 16.9 
Ireland    28.0  57.1   + 29.1 
Netherlands   33.7  63.7   + 30.0 
United Kingdom  32.6  47.4   + 14.8 
West European  
average   31.7  52.4   + 20.7 
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   24.8  60.7   + 35.9 
Finland   26.7  41.3   + 14.6 
Norway   29.9  48.8   + 18.9 
Sweden   31.1  67.3   + 36.2 
North European  
average   28.1  54.5   + 26.4 
____________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated from Saunders and Klau 1985: 29, Table 1. In the case of Greece 
expenditure includes only current disbursements. Data for Spain is for 1964-1981 and 
for Ireland and Portugal is for 1960-1981. 
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TABLE  4 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Total government current expenditure in Southern, Western, and Northern Europe in 
1980 and 1995 (as percentage of GDP) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
     1980  1995   Change 1995/80  
    
Southern Europe:  
Greece     31.1  38.8     +7.7 
Italy     37.6  48.0   +10.4 
Portugal    28.9  37.7     +8.8 
Spain      23.8  36.8   +13.0 
South European  
average    30.4  40.3    +9.9 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium    46.6  47.9    +1.3  
France     37.4  44.4    +7.0 
Germany    …..  32.2    …. 
Ireland     40.4  39.3     -1.1 
Netherlands    48.2  49.3    +0.1 
United Kingdom   36.4  39.6    +3.2 
West European  
average    41.8  42.0    +0.2 
   
Northern Europe: 
Denmark    36.7   42.0        +5.3 
Finland    25.2   42.0    +16.8 
Norway    33.4   39.1        +5.7 
Sweden    37.5   43.6        +6.1 
North European  
average    33.2   41.7        +8.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated from The World Bank 1997: 241, Table 14. 
 
How can the above trends be explained? Briefly, the growth of the Greek and the 
Italian state in the 1980s in terms of expenditure may be partly linked to servicing a 
growing public debt. A second reason was that Greece and Spain in particular increased 
their welfare spending. A third reason may have to do with the indiscriminate 
recruitment of new personnel through the enduring structures of party patronage in all 
four South European countries. It seems that political parties contributed to the overall 
expansion of bureaucracy through patronage appointments (Morlino 1995: 358).  
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TABLE  5 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Total government revenue in Southern, Western, and Northern Europe in 1960 and in 
1982 (as percentage of GNP) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    1960  1982  Change 1982/60 
Southern Europe:   
Greece    21.1  31.3   + 10.2 
Italy    28.8  41.5   + 12.7 
Portugal   17.6  33.2   + 15.6  
Spain     18.8  30.6   + 11.8 
South European  
average   21.6  34.2   + 12.6 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium   27.5  45.4   + 17.9 
France    34.9  46.9   + 12.0 
Germany   35.1  45.3   + 10.2 
Ireland    24.8  42.3   + 17.5 
Netherlands   33.9  55.8   + 21.9 
United Kingdom  30.3  43.7   + 13.4 
West European  
average   31.1  46.6   + 15.5 
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   27.3  45.4   + 18.1 
Finland   30.0  39.7   + 19.7 
Norway   33.1  52.8   + 19.7 
Sweden   32.2  59.7   + 27.5 
North European  
average   30.7  49.4   + 18.7 
____________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated from Saunders and Klau 1985: 29, Table 1. Data for Spain is for 
1964-1981 and for Ireland and Portugal is for 1960-1981. 
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TABLE  6 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Total government tax revenue in Southern, Western, and Northern Europe in 1980 
and in 1995 (as percentage of GDP) 
___________________________________________________________________
     1980  1995  Change 1995/80 
Southern Europe:   
Greece     27.4  26.0     -1.4  
Italy     29.1  38.4    +9.3  
Portugal    24.3  30.9    +6.6 
Spain      22.2  28.7    +6.5  
South European  
average    25.8  31.0    +5.3 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium    41.7  43.7    +2.0 
France     36.7  38.1    +1.4 
Germany    …..  30.0     …. 
Ireland     30.9  35.1    +4.2  
Netherlands    44.2  42.9     -1.3  
United Kingdom   30.6  33.5    +2.9 
West European  
average    36.8  37.2   + 0.4 
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark    31.3  35.4    +4.3  
Finland    25.1  29.3    +4.2 
Norway    33.9  31.6     -2.3 
Sweden    30.1  32.4    +2.7 
North European  
average    30.1  32.3   + 2.2 
___________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated from The World Bank 1997: 241, Table 1.4. The World Bank has 
not included data for Germany in 1980. 
 
  
Tables 5 and 6 show that, in terms of revenue, in the post-war period and before the 
beginning of the period of state retrenchment, South European states used to be 
considerably smaller than West and North European states; and that between 1960 
and 1982 the increase in size of South European states was comparable to that of 
West European states, but still smaller than the corresponding increase of North 
European ones. On the basis of Table 6, it can be said that in 1980-1995, South 
European states increased their tax raising capacity much faster than the rest of 
European states. As a consequence, the levels of tax revenue as a share in GDP of 
South and North European states had converged by 1995, but both were lower than 
the corresponding West European levels. 
 Overall, any impression that the state in Southern Europe was comparatively 
overgrown needs to be qualified. There are two criteria or ways to evaluate whether a 
state is over-grown or not. The first way is cross-sectional comparison with other states. 
As noted above, data shows that - in terms of government expenditure and revenue - 
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South European states lagged behind West and North European states until the early 
1980s. Thereafter, the former grew substantively. In proportional terms the South 
European states were not larger than other European ones.  
The second way to argue that a state is overgrown is to claim that its size is not 
commensurate to the level of development of the national economy in which it is 
embedded. The relevant hypothesis is that extended state intervention is closely linked 
with industrial development and that most, but not all, advanced economies have 
evolved along with large state mechanisms and have supported extended social welfare 
systems. With regard to this criterion, it is implausible to claim that in the 1980s 
Southern Europe as a whole was comparatively under-developed and to argue that, given 
such economic underdevelopment, the state in Southern Europe was disproportionately 
developed. Even Greece and Portugal, which in the 1980 were the poorest West 
European countries, were members of one of the world’s most advanced economic 
entities, the EC (Greece since 1981, Portugal since 1986). In the 1980s, as is well 
known, Italy was already a large industrial power, and Spain experienced rapid 
economic growth and also became an EC member in 1986. Thus, in none of the above 
two ways could it be claimed that South European states were disproportionately large. 
 To sum up this section, South European states were never particularly large. In 
fact, they used to lag behind other European states in terms of public spending and 
revenue. Over time they have closed this gap. Such a convergence was particularly 
noticeable after the beginning of the 1990s. However, this transformation does not seem 
to have eradicated political clientelism, a traditional organizational principle of politics 
in Southern Europe. This was a major trait of our ‘model’ of South European 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
3. Polititical clientelism ‘at the top’:  The extended politicisation of the higher 
civil service 
 
With regard to public administration, it is necessary to distinguish between two levels of 
clientelism and to claim that the term has two meanings. A first meaning or level of 
clientelism is  extended politicisation of the managerial level of the civil service and 
public sector hierarchy (‘clientelism at the top’). By referring to the ‘top’, we mean the 
higher echelons of ministries and public enterprises. After each government turnover, a 
large and often fluctuating number of top administrative posts are filled by appointees of 
the governing elite. These appointees are not necessarily civil servants. But even in the 
top posts reserved for career civil servants, there is apparent political party intervention. 
As we will try to show below, in most South European bureaucracies, incoming 
governments can influence the process of promotions to the managerial level to an extent 
larger than their counterparts can do in other, West or North European bureaucracies. 
The distinctive aspect of South European politicization is that political 
intervention from above can sometimes reach down to the middle ranks of the civil 
service hierarchy and out to a large number of public corporations. The purpose of 
extending the long arm of the governing party, so to speak, into the bureaucracy is to 
prevent the latter from obstructing the implementation of government policy. 
Bureaucratic obstruction is not uncommon in any state apparatus which has previously 
served a different regime (e.g., an authoritarian regime). On the other hand, extensive 
political intervention ‘from above’ may bring about demoralization of the civil service 
and thus hamper bureaucratic efficiency. 
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The second meaning refers to what is most commonly understood by the term 
‘clientelism’: recruitment of employees at the lower levels and in-service transfers on the 
basis of particularistic criteria, such as political party affiliation. The above two distinct 
levels of clientelism have always been extensive and inter-linked: it is difficult to obtain 
a meritocratic and effective higher civil service if the members of the lower civil service 
are recruited and promoted on the grounds of clientelistic criteria. Nonetheless, the two 
levels have a different function.  
Some political colonisation ‘at the top’ of the civil service is practised in liberal 
democracies by many incoming governments. Such a practice enhances the 
responsiveness of the state administration to the changing will of the electorate. By itself, 
political control of the bureaucracy 'from above' is not a distinctive South European trait. 
For instance, in the U.S. some 10,000 positions change hands at every presidential 
turnover. Given the size and international role of the U.S. administration, this is in not 
such a large number. However, the equivalent practice seems more exaggerated in the 
comparatively smaller administrations of Southern Europe. Take the example of the 
smallest South European state, Portugal: it has been estimated that after the elections of 
October 1995 in Portugal, approximately 6,000 political appointments were made by the 
incoming government of the socialist party (PS) at the top of various ministries and 
public agencies (Oliveira Rocha 1998: 225). This was not an exceptional situation. 
Large-scale changes of this kind, at top hierarchical posts, had taken place in 1986-87, 
when the Portuguese Social Democratic party (PSD) formed a majoritarian government. 
Similar changes had occurred in 1974-1976, at the fall of Salazar’s authoritarian regime. 
Comparable phenomena took place in Spain in 1982, when the socialist party (PSOE) 
came to power and again in 1996, when the conservative party (Partido Popular- PP) 
replaced PSOE in power (Parrado 2000: 266). Such practices were very common also in 
Greece after each regime and government change. Moreover, in Greece changes in the 
posts of General and Special Secretaries of Ministries and managers of major public 
corporations used to occur in the 1980s and the 1990s even after each reshuffling of the 
Cabinet of one and the same government.  
Italy seemed to be somewhat spared of this practice of recurrent massive changes 
of personnel of different political persuasions at the top of ministries and public 
corporations. Managerial-level changes involved members of the post-war conservative 
political class. Career civil servants were less affected. Despite the frequent government 
turnover, the stability of the administrative personnel’s profile was probably owed to the 
‘re-cycling’ of the same political elites and to the relative isolation of bureaucrats from 
politicians throughout the rule of the Christian Democratic party (DC) in the post-war 
period. However, surprisingly enough, Italy may have belatedly caught up with the other 
South European countries: since 1998, a legislative decree has tied the occupants of the 
upper echelons of the civil service with incoming governments (Battini 1998: 214-15, 
Lewanski 1999: 121). Also, contrary to an Italian practice dating since 1924, the same 
1998 decree allowed for the appointment not only of civil servants but also of politically 
loyal but ‘outside’ experts to the 'cabinet ministeriels'. These staff units were also found 
at the side of cabinet ministers in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bureaucracies. 
 Although such 'cabinets' originated in other European countries (e.g., in France) 
and top civil servants serving in the highest ranks of other bureaucracies were 
traditionally politicised (e.g., the Belgian ‘cabinets’, the German 'political bureaucrats'), 
what is peculiar about Southern Europe is that the breadth of political appointments to 
the bureaucracy has been quite extended and perhaps unpredictable. Tenured 
bureaucratic positions could become slots for temporary political appointees and vice 
versa. In that respect, the aforementioned Italian change towards more politicisation was 
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not an exception; Greece, Portugal, and Spain witnessed similar situations at different 
time points.  
In Greece the posts of directors general were abolished all together in 1982, a 
little after the arrival of the socialist party (PASOK) in power. The functions of the 
abolished posts were assumed by appointed 'cabinets ministeriels' and Special 
Secretariats. In 1990, the abolished post were re-instituted with the return of the 
conservative party (ND) to power (Spanou 1996: 107 and 109, Sotiropoulos 1999: 16). 
In Portugal in 1989, a law specified that the two highest among the four top civil service 
posts (i.e., the posts of directors general and deputy directors general) were to be filled 
by the government among candidates from outside the civil service. The lower two posts 
(directors of service and heads of division) were to be filled by civil servants again 
selected by the government. However, in the late 1990s in Portugal there were efforts to 
decrease the extent of politicisation. A new law passed in 1997 specified that the two 
lower posts were to be filled by civil servants through competitive entrance examinations 
(Oliveira Rocha 1998: 225-26).  
In Spain, the top civil service had been politicised under Franco in the sense that 
many bureaucrats probably identified with the Franco regime. Yet they were not 
dramatically affected by the rather consensual transition to democracy in 1975-77. 
However, at the first government turnover, in 1982, when PSOE came to power, two 
hundred top posts changed hands. Between 1982 and 1991 90 per cent of all occupants 
of top posts had never served in a post of similar level before (Alba 1998: 237 on the 
basis of research by Sebastiano Parrado). When the conservative party (PP) came to 
power in 1996, it replaced all civil servants from  hierarchical level no. 29 (included) 
upwards, i.e., the occupants of the top managerial levels, and all directors of public 
enterprises. A relevant law passed in the late 1990s had failed to specify with precision 
the break-point in the top echelons of the civil service at which the discretion of the 
government to nominate its sympathisers ended. Similar and, in fact, more accentuated 
trends towards the expansion of the discretion of political power to nominate top 
administrators had been observed in the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country since 1980 (Alba 1998: 239-40). 
 Such changes in the breadth of top political appointments and in selecting 
politically loyal higher civil servants were more facilitated and occurred earlier in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain than in Italy. This was probably owed to extended periods of 
submission of the legislature to the executive branch of government, i.e., periods of 
majoritarian party government, in the first three countries. Such periods occurred in 
Greece and Spain since the transition to democracy (mid-1970s) and later in Portugal 
(since the mid-1980s). Majoritarian governments, having no coalition partner, were not 
inhibited by political alliances vital to the survival of the government. Governments 
generally stayed in power for longer periods of time and possibly possessed a stronger 
political will to control the highest levels of the civil service than was the case with Italy.  
 So, in contrast to Northern and Western Europe, politicisation in Southern 
Europe was not limited to the highest levels, such as the level of 'cabinets 
ministeriels.’ At the levels of top civil service which were just below the level of 
minister and his or her 'cabinet' (i.e., at the levels of heads of general directorates, 
directorates, and even sections), the occupants were recruited from among eligible 
civil servants who were also political sympathisers of the party (or coalition of 
parties) in government. This was not equally necessary and did not happen in all four 
countries under study to the same extent. The point is that politicisation 'trickled-
down' and was spread also in lower ranks in an ebb and flow manner.  
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The above patterns had two likely consequences at the level of attitudes and 
motivation of many South European civil servants. The first consequence was that 
competent civil servants were bypassed by their politically more agile colleagues or 
by outside experts. Career civil servants thus became demoralised. The second 
consequence was that soon most civil servants became politicised. In other words, 
they looked for political patrons and tied their professional careers with the parties to 
which their patrons belonged. Hence, the reproduction of political clientelism at the 
top, which was - and perhaps still is - a major trait of our ‘model’ of South European 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
4. Political clientelism ‘from below’: The state as a 'social shock absorber' 
 
Another relevant trait was the other side of political clientelism ‘at the top’. This trait, 
which can be called ‘clientelism from below,’ referred to the relation between political 
parties and society. Through the intermediation of parties, the public sector used to fulfil 
a well-known social function in Southern Europe. This was the function of alleviating 
social pressures 'from below', from unemployed, unemployable or professionally 
insecure social categories of the population. Relevant examples included graduates of 
law, political science and humanities faculties, high-school graduates without university 
education and internal migrants. The function consisted in offering them job 
opportunities in the public sector, during periods of rising unemployment or just before 
the conduct of general elections (the 'political-electoral cycle'). This pattern was 
observed more in comparatively underdeveloped regions (e.g., Southern Italy, 
Andalusia) or whole countries (e.g., Greece, Portugal after the 1974 Revolution) and 
went through high and low points over time. For instance, it seems that it was intensified 
in Italy in the 1970s (Morlino 1984: 62), in Portugal between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1980s and in Spain after 1982, probably more so in some Spanish regional 
governments than in the central government (Hopkin 2001: 128 and 132). The pattern 
was stronger in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
The tendency was for more recurrent massive recruitment of new personnel to 
the wider public sector than to the central public administration. In the public sector, 
recruitment was done without regard to the specific needs of public corporations. The 
absorption of new personnel was effected through extraordinary procedures, e.g., 
through by-passing competitive entrance examinations. This was the first step in a 
process labelled 'titularisation' which was quite common in all four countries in Southern 
Europe. Titularisation involves hiring personnel to meet temporary labour shortages in 
the public sector and then granting this temporary personnel the status of civil servant or 
its equivalent (i.e., permanent job contracts). In Italy, as Sabino Cassesse writes, 'it can 
be estimated that, in 1973-90, about 350,000 people were recruited without entrance 
exams, and then had their posts made permanent by 12 special laws. In the same period, 
in the same administration, about 250,000 people were recruited through regular exams. 
It seems therefore that titularisation is the predominant way of entry into the civil service' 
(Cassesse 1993a: 325). In Greece, laws passed since the transition to democracy offered 
tenure to successive waves of temporary employees who had been employed on the 
basis of renewable fixed term contracts or contracts for the duration of specific projects 
(Sotiropoulos 1996: 98-100). 
Generally, clientelism 'from below' was not a new phenomenon. As it is well 
known, it was not observed for the first time in the post-authoritarian period. It had 
affected public employment in the past. The growth of public employment did not 
 36
coincide with the transition from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe. For instance, 
according to one estimate, between 1965 and 1978 the share of the public sector in total 
employment rose from 9.9 to 14.2 per cent in Italy, from to 4.8 to 8.1 per cent in 
Portugal, and from 6.6. to 12.3 per cent in Spain (OECD 1982: 12). This data shows that, 
in terms of employment, South European states used to grow over time. Nevertheless, in 
Portugal a sharp increase in public employment roughly coincided with the period of  
transition to democracy; in Greece and Spain, the rise coincided most probably with the 
transition to democracy and with the ascent of socialists to power in the early 1980s in 
both countries; and in Italy, public employment grew throughout the more extended 
period of democratic consolidation (late 1940s – mid-1970s). 
In detail, in Portugal, in the period after the Revolution of April 1974 the public 
sector absorbed excess labour created by the economic crisis which followed the regime 
change and by the influx of refugees (the 'retornados') from the former Portuguese 
colonies. Many banks and other private enterprises were nationalised. As a result, public 
employment rose very fast (Graham 1986: 6, Bruneau and Macleod 1986: 188-89, 
Opello 1991: 132-33).  
In Italy, in the post-war period the social coalition between northern industrialists 
and southern landowners reproduced the earlier patronage patterns which had been 
suitable to their interests. They sought to fragment and to exclude the lower social 
classes from power (Shefter 1977: 444). This strategy of public labour supply ‘from 
above’ was met by a corresponding demand for work ‘from below’. Throughout the 
post-war period, public employment rose steadily corresponding to the demand for jobs 
emanating mostly from the South of Italy, which was economically underdeveloped. 
This led to the 'Southernisation' (or 'meridionalisation') of the Italian civil service. 
Compared to the population of Northern Italy, the population of Southern Italy was over-
represented among Italian civil servants, including the highest ranks of the civil service 
(Cassesse 1993a: 319 and 323, Lewanski 1999: 105-06). Approximately two-thirds of all 
civil servants came from the South (Arabia and Giammusso 1993: 441).  
In Greece, there was a net increase of 2 percent in the Greek labour force 
between 1981 and 1988, while, during the same years, the net increase in the civil 
service personnel was 12 percent (Sotiropoulos 1996: 118). In the Greek wider public 
sector, there was a similar discrepancy between new total employment and new public 
employment trends  (Christodoulakis 2000: 100-01). In Spain this function of the public 
sector as a 'safety-valve' for unemployment was also visible. Patronage-driven 
recruitment followed the rise of the socialist party in power in 1982 (Beltran 1990: 347, 
Puhle 2001: 320).  
As noted earlier, in terms of government employment in the 1980s on average 
South European states grew more than West European ones (Tables 4 and 6). Similar 
trends had been visible since at least the 1960s. To what extent may public employment 
growth be attributed to clientelism ‘from below’? There may be three sources of such 
growth. First, as noted above, at various periods of time South European governments 
sought to curb unemployment by using the state as a 'social shock absorber'. Second, 
growth in public employment may be also accounted by the fact that extended patronage 
was exercised for electoral purposes by the socialist governments which ruled in Greece 
and Spain in the 1980s (Gillespie 1990: 132, Puhle 2001: 320-21). Third, the rise in 
public employment may also be interpreted by the expansion of social policy. The 
welfare state, which in Southern Europe has not been as developed as in Western Europe 
(Ferrera 1996), expanded significantly in the period of democratic consolidation. This 
was evident, e.g., in the growth of expenditure on pensions and unemployment benefits 
in Greece and Spain (Gunther 1996, Maravall 1997); in the creation of National Health 
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Services in Greece in 1983 and in Italy in 1978; and in the introduction of a minimum 
income guarantee schemes in Italy, Portugal and various Spanish regions in the early and 
mid-1990s (Matsaganis, Ferrera, Capucha and Moreno 2003).  
Public employment in Southern Europe tended to be costly. Table 7 indicates 
that South European states used to spend relatively large shares of their state budgets 
in compensation (wages and salaries). Overall, compared with the 1980s, in the first 
half of the decade of the 1990s South European states followed the general trend 
towards a decrease of the share of wages and salaries in the state budget. This was a  
familiar trend in Western Europe, linked with the ‘retreat of the state’ (Mueller and 
Wright 1994). However, in two consecutive periods, 1981-1990 and 1991-1995, in 
Southern Europe the average share of public employee wages and salaries in the state 
budget was still roughly double the corresponding shares in West and North European 
state budgets (Table 7).  
How do those trends compare with the trends in public employment shown in 
Table 8 below? Generally, as a share of  total employment, South European states 
employed in the 1980s personnel amounting roughly to 60 per cent of the equivalent 
personnel of West European states and approximately 50 per cent of the that of North 
European states. Thus, the picture in terms of public employment (Table 8) is the 
reverse of that of compensation of public employees (Table 7): In comparative terms, 
South European states used to employ relatively fewer people than North or West 
European states, but devoted a larger share of their state budgets to their 
compensation. Conversely, again in relative terms, in North and West European states 
public employment as a share of total employment on average was larger than in 
South European states. Simultaneously the share of state budgets allocated to 
compensation on average was smaller in West and North than in South European 
states (Table 7).  
This is probably an additional indication of the different orientation, if not 
different functions, of South European states, on the one hand, and North and West 
European states, on the other. The former used to be employing agencies, i.e., ‘social 
shock absorbers’, in a manner different from the welfare functions fulfilled by North 
European states which help people at risk, such as the unemployed and the poor, 
through extended welfare services. A distinctive function of South European 
bureaucracies was to provide income to their employees rather than welfare services 
to citizens at risk.  
Social protection is supposed to be temporary, while the risk lasts, while 
employment in the state apparatus is or can become permanent. In a nutshell, one 
could argue that traditionally South European states offered jobs, while other EU 
states offered social protection. It is arguable then that South European states used to 
cater to the economic needs of the political clienteles of alternating governing elites, 
taking care of the working population safely employed in the public sector. By 
contrast, West and particularly North European states had developed more 
universalistic welfare systems. States in the Western and in the Northern part of the 
European continent had a longer and more enduring tradition of catering to the needs, 
not only of a particular segment of the active labour force, i.e., the segment which was 
employed in the public sector, but to the general population as a whole. 
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TABLE  7 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Average share of wages and salaries in total public expenditure in Southern, Western 
and Northern Europe in 1981-1990 and 1991-1995 (as percentage of the state budget) 
       (I)  (II) 
    1981-90 1991-95 Change  (II)/(I) 
___________________________________________________________________
  
Southern Europe:  
Greece    24.8  21.1     -3.7  
Italy    11.7  11.7      0.0 
Portugal   22.0  28.5    +6.5 
Spain     21.6  14.9     -6.7 
South European  
average   20.0  19.1     -0.9 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium   14.2  14.2     0.0 
France    17.8  16.3    -1.5 
Germany     8.6    7.6    -1.0 
Ireland    12.8  13.2   +0.4 
Netherlands     9.1    8.7    -0.4 
United Kingdom  12.8  10.4    -2.4 
West European  
average   12.6  11.7    -0.9 
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   12.6   11.4    -1.2 
Finland   10.4     7.8    -2.6 
Norway     9.0     8.0     -1.1 
Sweden     6.3     5.8     -0.5 
North European  
average     9.6     8.3     -1.3 
__________________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated from The World Bank 1997: 199, Table A.2. 
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TABLE  8 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Comparative evolution of government employment in Southern, Western, and Northern 
Europe between 1980 and 1990 (percentage share of government employment in total 
employment) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    1980 1985 1988 1990 Change 1990/80 
Southern Europe: 
 
Greece       8.9   9.9 10.1 10.2  + 1.3 
Italy    15.7 16.8 17.3 17.2  + 1.5  
Portugal   10.7 13.2 14.1 14.3  + 3.6 
Spain     10.5 13.4 14.1 14.5  + 4.0 
South European  
average   11.5 13.3 13.9  14.1  + 2.6 
  
Western Europe: 
France    20.0 22.7 22.9 22.6  + 2.6 
Germany   14.6 15.6 15.5 15.2  + 0.6  
Ireland    16.4 18.8 18.4 17.2  + 0.8 
Netherlands   14.8  16.0 15.4 14.9  + 0.1 
United Kingdom  21.3 21.7 20.7 19.1  - 2.2 
West European  
average   17.4 19.0 18.6 17.8  + 0.4 
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   28.3 29.7 29.4 29.9  + 1.6 
Finland   17.2 19.2 20.6 20.9  + 3.7 
Norway   25.3 29.2 29.3 32.0  + 6.7 
Sweden   30.7 32.9 31.8 31.8  + 1.1 
North European  
average   25.4 27.8 27.8 28.7  + 3.3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Wright 1994: 137, Table 5, which was reproduced 
from OECD's Analytical Database (segment EOY) of March 1991. Data for other West 
European countries, such as Belgium, was incomplete. 
 
To recap, the purpose of over-staffing the state was to return the governing elite 
to power through the classic clientelistic exchange of favours for votes in general 
elections. Another purpose was to ease social tensions emanating from persistent local 
'pockets' of underdevelopment or periodic waves of unemployment. This function of the 
South European state mechanisms as 'social shock absorbers' or as 'safety valves' 
combined with the expansion of the welfare services, which in Southern Europe until the 
late 1970s and early 1980s lagged behind the equivalent West European services. The 
combined effect of the two processes explains the expansion of public employment in 
Southern Europe in the post-authoritarian period.  
 To sum up our discussion of clientelism ‘from below,’ what distinguishes 
South European public sectors from those of the rest of Western Europe was a different 
relation with society. This is a well-known relation explored by many analysts of 
individual South European societies (e.g., Graziano 1978 on Italy, Mouzelis 1986 on 
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Greece). Generally speaking, the public sector in Southern Europe used to constitute a 
desirable outlet for large segments of the active labour force, and more precisely for the 
petty bourgeoisie and the middle class. Such pressures 'from below' were compounded 
by a specific political party function. In Southern Europe the function of political parties 
in relation to the state was somewhat different from the corresponding functions in other 
European societies.  
While all modern parties perform several roles in the context of linking society to 
the political system, South European political parties used to perform what Leonardo 
Morlino has called the role of 'gate-keepers' of the 'decisional area' (Morlino 1995: 350-
51). South European parties did so much more than was the case with parties in other 
contemporary Western systems. They controlled access of interest groups to the state, 
sometimes restricting, while more often facilitating access to state resources. The party 
predominating in elections often used to proceed with a partisan penetration of the state. 
This role was played differently in some South European countries than in other ones. In 
that respect, for instance, in Greece party patronage had a more serious and lasting effect 
on the central public administration than in Spain. In the latter country, similar effects 
were observed not so much at the level of central government as in the regional levels of 
'Communidades Autonomas'. Clientelism was exacerbated in some cases (e.g., in 
Catalonia, the Basque Country), where there was no government turnover for long 
periods of time. 
 
 
5. The uneven character of the public sector 
 
This trait of the ‘model’ of South European bureaucracy has been possibly associated 
with the particular social function discussed above, namely public employment as a 
‘safety valve’. South European bureaucracies have not been as large as some neo-liberal 
polemicists of the state have thought. Still, these bureaucracies have been characterised 
by an uneven distribution of personnel. This trait has flowed as an outcome of the erratic 
application of the principle of political clientelism in the allocation of human resources. 
As a result, South European bureaucracies have been overstaffed in some of their 
quarters, owing to successive mass recruitment made by alternating political regimes and 
parties.  
Traditionally, as noted above, there was hiring of unskilled or low-skilled labour, 
in exchange of the votes cast by the hired employee and his (her family). Since the mid-
1980s, there has been pressure by the EC (now the EU) to practice fiscal austerity and 
cut down on public employment growth. At the same time, new administrative units 
have been created which were necessary for the absorption of EC funds and the 
implementation of EC policies. In contrast to past hiring practices, due to such highly 
specific tasks, the new units were staffed by highly skilled personnel (economists, 
engineers, etc.) 
On the other hand, South European bureaucracies have remained understaffed in 
certain other administrative domains. For instance, certain public agencies, such as the 
Italian postal service or the Greek state airlines, have hired an excessive number of 
employees. Other public services, particularly in remote or mountainous provinces, have 
remained understaffed. In the late 1980s, there were more civil servants per 1,000 
inhabitants in the Center and the South than in the North of Italy (Arabia and 
Giammusso 1993: 441, Cassesse 1993a: 335-36). There was  also excessive personnel is 
some Italian schools and in the state-run railway company. By contrast, there was 
insufficient personnel in the Italian ministries of industry and of environment and in 
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other more technical services (D’ Orta  1990: 447). A similar trend was observed in 
Greece, in the urban conglomerates of Athens and Thessaloniki, in comparison with any 
other regions or cities of Greece. Schools and hospitals in various remote Greek regions 
are still understaffed. In Spain, the Ministry of Agriculture and the local government of 
Madrid were overstaffed, while the police and the traffic agency lacked personnel 
(Parrado 2000: 257-58). 
 
 
6. Lack of an administrative elite 
 
In modern Europe, states were distinguished by the presence of an administrative elite 
(Armstrong 1973, Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981). In Southern Europe, 
particularly so in Greece and Italy (Cassesse 1993b: 336, Sotiropoulos 1993), there is no 
such thing as a typical European administrative elite. Spain seems to be different on that 
count, given that in the central services of Spanish ministries there are higher civil 
servants who enjoy some power and prestige (personal interviews of the author in 
Madrid during 1994-95). This is not the case with Greece and Italy. Attempts to 
construct an administrative elite, as with the creation of 'dirigenza' in Italy and the 
foundation of elite national schools of public administration in the early 1980s in Italy 
and Greece, have failed (Della Cananea 1998 on Italy, Papoulias, Sotiropoulos and 
Economou 2002 on Greece). As a consequence, there is no equivalent to the British or 
the French higher officialdom, with its considerable political influence and social status.  
In Greece, civil servants have adapted to the plans of intruding politicians, 
putting up relatively little resistance against dramatic transformations of administrative 
structures or personnel policies (Sotiropoulos 1996). Particularly in the central public 
administrations of Greece and Portugal, and less so in Italy or Spain, incoming 
governments often have felt free to bring about major changes, not only in the hierarchy 
of the civil service, but also in matters of personnel management.  
However, in the wider public sector of all four South European countries, the 
unions of public employees, working for public enterprises and state-run companies, 
were often very strong. All incoming governments had to establish a 'modus vivendi' 
with public sector unions which were staunch defenders of their privileges and interests. 
The resistance put up by such associations was powerful. Still, their resistance was more 
effective with regard to compensation, social security, and other rights than with regard 
to the distribution of political power between bureaucrats and politicians. Both of these 
groups functioned in a tense co-habitation inside the state apparatus. At times, even 
strong labour unions were unable (or reluctant) to counter the depth and the breadth of 
successive interventions of alternating party governments in the appointment and 
transfer of public employees.  
 As noted above, patronage practices did not apply only to the lower layers of the 
civil service. Several of the top layers of the administrative hierarchy were also filled 
with political appointees or handpicked civil servants, shortly after the rise of a new 
government to power. In that respect, senior civil servants in Southern Europe, with the 
possible exception of Spain, were not part of the ‘power elite’. In Spain, there was a 
tradition of technocratic, ‘insulated’ bureaucracy, to some extent even under 
authoritarian rule. This tradition has probably contributed towards the preservation of 
some autonomy of the Spanish civil service, during and after transition to democracy. In 
Italy and Greece, lack of such a tradition has led many civil servants to become very 
skilful at utilising party and union ties, in order to protect and promote their careers and 
administrative roles. It comes then as no surprise that in the past top civil servants in 
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Greece and Italy were usually characterised by limited effectiveness and low prestige; 
and that, as research has shown, they used to hold relatively non-democratic attitudes 
even after the fall of authoritarianism (Putnam 1973 on Italy, Sotiropoulos 1991 on 
Greece). 
To sum up our discussion so far, how could we answer the question of the 
subtitle of this paper? We would submit that - compared to North and West European 
bureaucracies - South European bureaucracies have probably shown extensive 
politicisation of their top echelons and political patronage in regard to recruitment of 
civil service personnel. Those bureaucracies also used to function as a 'safety valve' in 
times of rising unemployment with the result that the wider public sector of South 
European states at times grew in leaps and bounds. Other distinguishing traits of South 
European bureaucracies were formalism and legalism; over-production and 
fragmentation of regulations; relatively large discrepancies between formal regulations 
and common, actual practices; uneven distribution of resources in the public sector of 
each country; and, finally, lack of a substantial administrative elite combined with a 
periodically strong trade union movement in the wider public sector. Taken together, the 
above traits may consist a loose, ‘model’ or ‘family’ of South European bureaucracy, 
allowing for variations from one country to the other. 
 
 
 
D. Between myth and reality: bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption in Southern 
Europe  
 
As noted above, the comparative study of the state in Southern Europe has not been 
systematic. As a result, there are grounds for the growth or reproduction of stereotypes. 
For example, it is easy to claim that South European states are organized in a less 
rational fashion than other European states located to the West or to the North of 
Southern Europe. Such claims of irrationality may be exemplified in bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption.  
 
 
1. Bureaucratic inefficiency 
 
A first common stereotype is that South European state bureaucracies are inefficient and 
sluggish. The efficiency of public organisations is notoriously difficult to measure, let 
alone compare with that of equivalent organisations of other countries. One possible 
indicator is the size of government employment (Table 9). The relevant assumption is 
that bloated and overgrown states are less efficient than states which are more ‘lean’ in 
terms of personnel size. Another indicator may be state capacity to collect direct taxes on 
incomes and profits (Tables 10 and 11).6  
 
                                                 
6 This indicator should be used, not at a single time point, but over a long period of time, in order to balance 
periods of economic growth and recession.  
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TABLE 9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Percentage share of public employment over total paid (salaried) employment in 
Southern, Western, and Northern Europe in 1993-2001 (%) 
 
   1993  1996  2001  Change 2001/1996 
Southern Europe: 
Greece   13.4  13.0  12.3   - 0.7 
Italy   10.7  10.6  10.6      0.0  
Portugal   8.8   8.6   7.6   - 1.0 
Spain     7.7   8.1   7.2   - 0.9  
South European  
average  10.2  10.0   9.4   - 0.6 
 
   
Western Europe: 
France   10.8  10.9  10.6   - 0.3 
Germany    8.7    9.1    8.3   - 0.8 
Ireland    __    6.3    5.2   - 1.1 
Netherlands   __    7.5    7.1   - 0.4 
United Kingdom   6.9    6.4    7.1   +0.7  
West European  
average    8.8   8.0    7.7   - 0.3  
         
Northern Europe: 
Denmark  __   5.6  5.5   - 0.1 
Norway  __   6.1  6.3   + 0.2 
Sweden  __   5.9 (1998) 6.1   + 0.2 
North European  
average  __   5.9  6.0   + 0.1 
____________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of OECD 2002: Table 2, Civilian Labour Force, data for 
various countries (paid employment: distribution by branch and activity). The total paid 
employment includes persons who performed some work for wage or salary, in cash or 
in kind. 
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TABLE 10 
 
Direct tax-raising capacity of Southern, Western, and Northern European states, 1980-
1988 (percentages of GDP) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    Direct taxation on incomes and profits 
    1980      1988      Change 1988/80 
Southern Europe: 
Greece      5.7      6.4       + 0.7 
Italy      9.4       13.2    + 3.8  
Portugal    5.7        7.7       + 2.0 
Spain       6.3        9.7       + 3.4 
South European  
average    6.8           9.3        + 2.5 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium   17.8  17.5    - 0.3 
France        7.6          7.7        + 0.1 
Germany   13.3      12.8        - 0.5  
Ireland    12.4      16.0       + 3.6 
Netherlands   15.1       13.4      - 1.7  
United Kingdom  13.5       14.0      + 0.5 
West European  
average   13.3      13.6   + 0.3  
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   25.0       30.5       + 5.5 
Finland   16.2      19.1       + 2.9 
Norway   19.4      15.7        - 3.7 
Sweden   21.3      24.3       + 3.0 
North European  
average   20.5      22.4        + 1.9 
 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Wright 1994: 136, Table 4, which was reproduced 
from OECD's Revenue Statistics (OSIRIS database, segment TAXREV) of March 1991. 
Indirect taxes, such as levies imposed on some consumer products, are not included. 
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TABLE 11 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Comparative taxation in South, West and North European states, 1998 (percentages of 
total tax receipts) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   Direct taxation  Taxes on goods  Highest rate of 
on personal income  and services  personal income 
       tax (1999) 
     
Southern Europe: 
Greece     13.2       41.0      40.0 
Italy     25.0        27.4   50.8  
Portugal   17.1         41.3      46.6 
Spain      20.8         29.4      48.0  
South European  
average   19.0       34.8  48.5       
  
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium   30.7   24.9  65.6  
France      17.4          26.6       62.9  
Germany   25.0       27.4      55.9   
Ireland    30.9       38.7      48.3  
Netherlands   15.2        27.7    60.0   
United Kingdom  27.5        32.6     40.0  
West European  
average   24.5   29.7  55.5   
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark   51.6        33.2      63.3  
Finland   32.3       30.7  60.0       
Norway   27.3       37.2      49.3  
Sweden   35.0       21.6      58.2  
North European  
average   36.6       30.7  57.7 
 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of OECD 2001: 38-39. Data for Greece found by 
personal research. 
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In terms of government (or public) employment, between 1980 and 1990 the 
four South European states became sizeable, but they were still smaller than most of the 
other European states and certainly smaller than the Scandinavian ones. As Table 8 
(presented earlier in this paper) shows, the growth of public employment in Southern 
Europe was much higher than the corresponding West European rate in 1980-1990. Yet, 
it was smaller than the North European growth. In the 1990s there was a common 
attempt, throughout Western Europe, to decrease or at least stabilize the size of public 
employment. This is shown in Table 9 which presents the share of public employees in 
the total of salaried employees. Generally, in 1996-2001 public employment in Europe 
did not increase, with the exception of Norway, Sweden and the UK. Compared to 
Northern and Western Europe, Southern Europe has witnessed a somewhat more 
intensive effort to make public employment slimmer. So, if public employment size is an 
indicator of inefficiency, there is not enough evidence to suggest, that - comparatively 
speaking - South European states have been more inefficient than the rest of European 
states. By itself, the size of public employment does not reveal what the state actually 
does. It is thus an inadequate measure of bureaucratic inefficiency.7 
In terms of capacity to collect taxes on incomes and profits, it is well known that 
in Southern Europe there is large-scale unreported economic activity and also tax 
evasion. There is data showing that South European states seem less able to collect such 
taxes (Tables 10 and 11). However, is this a sign of state incapacity or of social class 
bias?  
On the basis of data shown in Table 10, it can be claimed that in the 1980s, 
compared to the North European or West European cases, the South European 
bureaucracies were the least capable to raise revenues from direct taxation. As Table 
10 indicates, between 1980 and 1988 the tax-raising capability of South European 
states rose more than that of West and North European states. However, on average, 
by 1988 South European countries still lagged behind all the rest (with the exception 
of France).  
The same was true ten years later, in 1998 (Table 11). This table shows a 
propensity on the part of South European states to apply indirect taxes, which are by 
their very nature regressive. Obviously, such taxes burden lower income groups more 
than higher income groups. On the basis of Tables 10 and 11, it seems that South 
European states do not emphasize the collection of direct taxes, which are 
progressive, as much as North and West European states do. This propensity of South 
European states probably betrays a social class bias in favour of upper income strata 
and strata which can avoid taxation, to an extent larger than in other European cases. 
Such strata which practice tax-evasion include, small shopkeepers, artisans and 
craftsmen, liberal professionals and, above all, big businesses.  
As data in the third column of Table 11 shows, there is a systemic cross-regional 
difference, namely a variation in tax legislation. Compared to North and West European 
states, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain impose lower rates of direct taxation on highest 
income groups. In other words, South European states systematically avoid to tax 
personal income at a high rate. For higher income earners, such as big businesses and 
higher-income liberal professionals, it is worth being taxed in Southern Europe rather 
than in Western or Northern Europe. Given that there is still no tax harmonisation in the 
EU, South European states remain more social class biased than other EU member- 
states.  
                                                 
7 I thank Dimitris Papadimitriou for this point. 
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In this respect, there is no linear evolution of Southern Europe towards the 
Western model of liberal democracy and capitalism. It appears that convergence with the 
West has only selectively taken place in Southern Europe. To sum up the argument so 
far in this section, on the basis of public employment size and state capacity to tax, it is 
not possible to be certain that South European states are more inefficient than other 
European states.  
Turning to other indicators of inefficiency, we may look at the performance of 
particular public services. An example is the effectiveness of systems of social 
assistance. Most EU welfare states have a battery of social transfers which are scheduled 
to decrease the rate of poverty in the population. Hypothetically, the danger of falling in 
poverty should be higher before the transfers have taken place than afterwards. This 
holds true for most EU member-states. However, research has shown that in Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain the difference in the danger of poverty before and after the 
actual distribution of social transfers is comparatively small (Table 1, in section A of this 
paper). 
 In 1997, in Southern Europe the extent of effectiveness of the relevant measures 
of social protection was much smaller than the effectiveness of the equivalent measures 
in Northern and in Western Europe.8 There are differentiations of this general tendency. 
In detail, in the mid 1990s, sickness and invalidity benefits reduced poverty by less than 
25 per cent in Greece, Italy and Portugal (and also Austria). Family benefits reduced 
poverty by less than 15 per cent in the four South European countries. Unemployment 
benefits contributed very little in reducing poverty in Portugal, Italy and Greece (and 
also in the Luxembourg and the UK. Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakloglou 2001: 563 and 
Table 7). We observe that not all South European countries can be lumped together and 
that some West European states show similar low performance. However, in all of the 
above cases at least three out of the four countries of our study are included in the group 
of low effectiveness.  
In the 1990s, the South European states were distinctly unable to lift the 
vulnerable groups of their populations out of  poverty (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos 
2002: 223, Sainsbury and Morissens 2002: 319). This was particularly true for poor old-
age pensioners, even though the bulk of social transfers from South European welfare 
states were directed to pensioners. South European societies share the characteristic of 
comparatively more widespread social exclusion which is associated with their very 
uneven welfare states. In view of the above, it is not unreasonable to conclude that South 
European social welfare services are among the least effective in the EU. An alternative 
conclusion may be that South European bureaucracies are among the least interested in 
reducing social inequalities and fighting poverty. One may again suspect that what we 
have observed is not so much a matter of efficiency as a matter of social class bias. 
With regard to inefficiency, however, there are also other sources of data, 
including sample surveys of the population and opinions of experts. Attitudinal data 
from 1980-83 on how efficient were various West European bureaucracies show that 
bureaucratic efficiency was perceived to be much higher in the UK, France, and 
Germany than in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal (in that order; data from The 
Economist Intelligence Unit in Christopoulos 1998: 4). Experts agree that for long 
periods of time specific sectors of the South European bureaucracies were very 
inefficient, including Italy which has been the most industrially advanced nation in the 
region (Della Cananea 1997: 203).  
                                                 
8 In this paragraph, I present my own calculations, based on data from 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-prot/soc-incl/indicator-eu.htm). I thank Dimitris 
Bourikos for emphasizing this point and providing me with the reference. 
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There is some impressionistic evidence on this matter. Greek public hospitals 
and public hospitals of the Italian South have acquired a bad reputation in terms of the 
quality of public health services they provide. Local users prefer to be hospitalised in 
other provinces or even in other countries or to resort to private alternatives in their 
country. Generally, in Italy state institutions perform less well in the South than in the 
North of the country (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993).  
There are examples from other quarters of the public sector. For instance,  the 
performance of the Italian postal services remains unpredictable. And large parts of the 
Greek railway network are still grossly underdeveloped. There seems to be a consensus 
in the literature that Greece and Italy have particularly inefficient bureaucracies 
(Papoulias 1991, Spiliotopoulos and Makrydemetris 2001, Makrydemetris 1999, Spanou 
1995, 1996, and 1998a, Danopoulos and Danopoulos 2001 on Greece; Cassese 1984, 
1988, 1993, and 1999, Spence 2000, Lewansky 1999 and 2000 on Italy). Inefficiency is 
also highlighted in the bibliography on the Portuguese and the Spanish bureaucracies: 
the main theme is that inefficiency is a  typical pattern on which there has been little 
improvement over time (Nieto 1984, Heywood 1995: 138-40, Alba 1995: 391 and 
Molina 1999: 50 and 52 on Spain; Corte-Real 2000: 24 and Graham 2001: 218 on 
Portugal).    
However, the above evidence is based on attitudes and for that matter is 
inconclusive. Allegations of inefficiency are common with reference to all modern large-
scale bureaucracies and do not exclusively concern South European bureaucracies. Such 
allegations have been part of the neo-liberal attack on the way public services used to be 
organized. There is an ideological element in the emphasis on inefficiency. While South 
European bureaucracies seem to function at below optimal levels, a strong emphasis on 
their technical deficiencies would mask their real distinguishing trait, which is a 
negligence of catering to the poorer social strata, if not an outright social class bias in 
favour of the upper strata. Obviously, inefficiency in the delivery of public services 
primarily hits the lower classes. The upper ones can, more often than not, resort to the 
private sector to obtain all kinds of services, including social insurance, schooling, health 
care and personal safety. 
It can also be argued that any client of modern bureaucratic organizations, be 
they private or public, will sooner or later experience delays or low quality of service. 
This is an obvious correlate of the scale of modern formal organizations. The larger the 
organization, the higher the chances of some kind of inefficiency. Ideally, inefficiency 
could be fought through more rational organization of the public services. However, the 
further rationalization of public services is a multi-faceted and evolving problem and no 
modern state bureaucracy is ever left without it. It could be that South European 
bureaucracies, despite all the relevant rhetoric of governments of the area and the reform 
agenda suggested by international organizations, have not changed as much as North and 
West European bureaucracies have done. Certainly, the everyday experience of living in 
Southern Europe leaves very much to be desired from the performance of public 
services. In sum, it is undeniable that some inefficiency, particularly in regard to public 
services, is more common in South European bureaucracies than in the equivalent 
bureaucracies of Northern and Western Europe.  
 
   
2. Corruption 
 
A second stereotypical characteristic of the state in Southern Europe refers to  
widespread corruption. The impression is that corruption is abundant in Southern Europe 
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although, of course, no one claims that it has reached East European or African 
proportions. On the one hand, there is some evidence supporting this impression. Table 
12 (below) shows two things: first that, at least at the level of perceptions, among the 
member-states of  EU there is no immaculate bureaucracy; and, second, that corruption 
is perceived to be more extended in Southern than in Western or Northern Europe. North 
European countries are associated with less corruption than West European countries. 
The latter, in turn, are associated with less corruption than South European countries. 
The distance among the three regions in terms of perception of corruption did not change 
a lot in 1995-2002. Still, over that time period, there was some improvement (less 
corruption perceived) in Southern Europe. By contrast there was little change in the 
other two regions.  
 
TABLE  12 
________________________________________________________________ 
Corruption perception index (1995-2002) for Southern, Western, and Northern Europe 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    1995  2002  Change 2002/95 
Southern Europe: 
Greece      4.0    4.2       + 0.2 
Italy      3.0       5.2       + 2.2  
Portugal    5.6      6.3       + 0.7 
Spain       4.3      7.1       + 2.8 
South European  
average    4.2       5.7        + 1.5 
  
Western Europe: 
Belgium    6.8  7.1    +0.3 
France      7.0        6.3           - 0.7 
Germany    8.1       7.3        - 0.8  
Ireland      8.6      6.9        - 1.7 
Netherlands     8.7        9.0        +0.3   
United Kingdom   8.6       8.7        - 0.1 
West European  
average    8.0      7.6         - 0.4  
 
Northern Europe: 
Denmark    9.3        9.5       + 0.2 
Finland    9.1       9.7       + 0.6 
Norway    8.6       8.5       -  0.1 
Sweden    8.9       9.3       + 0.4 
North European  
average    9.0       9.3        + 0.3 
____________________________________________________ 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Corruption Perception Index. Transparency 
International, 2003 Global Corruption Report: 264 (Corruption Perception Index) and 
Kazakos 2001: 423, Table 5.10. No corruption tends to 10.0; extreme corruption to 0.0.  
 
 
 
 
 50
On the other hand, it is very difficult to measure the extent of graft, sloth or 
sleaze in any state. The evidence discussed above comes from unspecified perceptions 
about corruption. Relevant attitudinal surveys register very general attitudes. They do not 
differentiate among various types of corruption nor do they distinguish clearly between 
bureaucrats and politicians. Most importantly for our purposes, such surveys of 
perceptions do not pertain specifically to the public administration and the public sector. 
Perhaps the incidence of corruption can be more safely deduced from particular 
administrative practices, i.e., from observed behaviour rather than from hearsay 
evidence.  
Some of the South European state apparatuses are periodically singled out as 
particularly problematic in terms of corruption. Specific events in Greece, Italy and 
Spain in the post-authoritarian period reinforced that impression. In the late 1980s 
Greece was swept by revelations of scandals involving ministers and managers of public 
enterprises appointed by the governing socialist party (PASOK). Two former ministers 
of the socialist government were found guilty by a special higher-instance court 
(Featherstone 1990: 106, Petras, Raptis, and Sarafopoulos 1993: 201-04, Koutsoukis 
1995). Others accusations were made against ministers of the conservative (ND) 
government in 1990-1993.  
In the first half of the 1990s similar developments occurred in Spain, where a 
few socialist ministers and the Governor of the Bank of Spain were implicated in cases 
of corruption (Heywood 1995a: 111-12, 115-20, Heywood 1995b). More extended and 
dramatic events of similar nature shook Italy in 1992-1994 and led to the shake-up of the 
Italian political system (Partridge 1995, Mershon and Pasquino 1995, Morlino 1996, 
Katz 1996, Sani and Segatti 2001). It has been argued that particularly in the post-
authoritarian period corruption in Southern Europe became very widespread, giving rise 
to a new entrepreneurial class with political connections (Kurth and Petras 1993). 
However, all the above refers to high-level corruption, i.e., corruption of governing elites 
and senior managers of public corporations. 
A distinction should be made between two forms of corruption (De Sousa Santos 
1986): first, corruption linked with white-collar crime and the promotion of large 
business interests; and second, 'petty' corruption, related to strategies of the lower social 
classes to circumvent legislation. Whereas the former type of corruption probably 
involves the cooperation of politicians and  high-level public managers, the latter 
requires the complicity of ‘street-level bureaucracy’. The first can be understood as high-
level corruption, while the second as low-level corruption.  
However, also in Western Europe from time to time there are reports about the 
involvement of politicians, including heads of state and former prime ministers, in cases 
of corruption. Such cases are not unknown in the recent history of Belgium, France and 
Germany. At that level, it is not possible to conclude that, comparatively speaking, South 
European states are more corrupt than the rest of the European states. A well known 
argument says that the public sphere in contemporary democracies, mediated by large 
broadcasting corporations and press conglomerates, is systematically ‘colonized’ by 
financial interests. To put it differently, the public sphere has been ‘re-feudalized’, i.e., 
carved up among different societal interests (Habermas 1996 [1962]). Particularly the 
way electoral campaigns are waged today, requires huge financial resources from 
political parties and individual politicians who are more and more drawn into corrupted 
practices to secure such resources. In this context, political parties have become ‘cartel 
parties’ (Katz and Mair 1996). In view of the above, it is not plausible to argue, let alone 
to show, that South European democracies in particular suffer more from this type of 
high-level, systematic corruption than the rest of West European democracies. 
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The case of low-level corruption is different and to a certain extent can be 
empirically shown. A concrete example is the disproportionate number of invalidity 
pensions issued in Greece and Italy by state-run medical committees (Ferrera 1996: 25-
26). Such committees are composed by physicians and administrators working for 
regional or local public health organizations. They are responsible for evaluating the 
medical record of individuals who petition for invalidity pensions, i.e., for early 
retirement and compensation by the social security system.  
In the 1980s, in certain areas of Greece (e.g., in Crete) and also in Italy, it was 
not uncommon to witness a flurry of such petitions, a large share of which were 
approved. In Greece, in 1984, 34 per cent of all new pensions, awarded in that year, were 
invalidity pensions. In Italy, until a reform (passed in 1984) tightened the relevant 
medical criteria, invalidity pensions served as a means of clientelistic exchange between 
politicians and petitioning voters (Ferrera 1996). It is difficult to prove the complicity of 
involved medical and civil service personnel in granting invalidity pensions to 
individuals who were perfectly capable of continuing full-time work. However, it is 
possible to think that in such circumstances under-the-table agreements between the 
petitioner and the relevant committee (or a politician in position to influence that 
committee) may have taken place.  
This kind of indications probably offers more solid evidence than attitudes on 
corruption registered in attitudinal surveys employed by Transparency International (TI). 
Even though TI uses not one but multiple samples per country, its survey results should 
be used with caution.9 As it is well known, attitudes can be influenced equally by 
personal experiences as well as by the word of mouth. Attitudes may reflect not so much 
reality, but stereotypes. In addition, as already noted, the Corruption Perception Index, 
constructed by TI, is not specific enough to distinguish between corruption at different 
levels of the political and of  the administrative system.  
Compared to the situation in Western and Northern Europe, chances are that 
corruption is distinctly more extended at the lower level of South European 
bureaucracies. This is the level of doctors and nurses of public hospitals, lower ranking 
customs officers, consulate officials, taxation officials and town planning employees. It 
could be that citizens are informally required or are tempted to engage in illegal 
exchanges more often in South European public services than in West or North 
European ones. This South European ‘exceptionalism’ is probably real but remains 
difficult to show. Until solid comparative evidence is produced on that matter, it is only  
possible to argue that South European states probably differ from North or West 
European ones in terms of more extensive low-level corruption. It does not look possible 
to argue the same about high-level corruption. 
To sum up this section, the commonly accepted, very abstract notions about  
widespread inefficiency and corruption in South European bureaucracies are not fully 
substantiated. Comparatively speaking, it is not possible to systematically distinguish 
South European bureaucracies from West European ones on the grounds of excessive 
inefficiency or corruption as such. At the most general and abstract level, these two 
characteristics may or may not be equally common to most contemporary European 
bureaucracies. After all, a certain degree of corruption and inefficiency are found in most 
- in not all - large, public or private, modern formal organizations.   
Admittedly, tourists, journalists and businessmen visiting Europe’s southern 
periphery can tell many infuriating stories of their encounters with various public 
                                                 
9 This is a point raised by Paul Heywood, who criticized the way the Corruption Perception Index is 
constructed and used, at his speech on political corruption in the European Institute of the L.S.E. on 29 
January 2003. 
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services in Southern Europe. The experiences of citizens of Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain are also telling, but are difficult to register and to systematize. There is some 
evidence that inefficiency in the delivery of public services and corruption at the lower 
levels of public administration are more widespread in the South than in the North or in 
the West of Europe. We may remain agnostic about the extent of such cross-regional 
differences, which, with regard to inefficiency and corruption, stand at the crossroads 
between myth and reality. 
 
 
 
E. Differentiation among South European bureaucracies 
 
While South European bureaucracies used to differ and, perhaps, to an extent still differ 
from North and West European ones, two caveats are due at this point: First, there are 
many differences among the four Southern European cases. Second, judgments about 
each of the four cases may be misleading, to the extent that within each of the four cases 
there are specific differentiations with regard to bureaucratic structure and function.    
 The first caveat means that, within the South European ‘model’ of  bureaucracy, 
there is enough variety which is owed to the vagaries of the socio-economic 
development and modern political history of the four countries under study. Such 
differences do not lead to grouping the cases under study into permanent sub-categories 
of the aforementioned loose ‘model’. Observed differences give rise to various 
configurations of the four cases. For instance, in regard to high government turnover, 
which facilitates a relative independence of civil service from incoming governing elites, 
Portugal until 1987 and Italy throughout the post-war period can be treated on a par. The 
reason is that both countries have witnessed many short-lived coalition cabinets. In the 
same respect, Greece and Spain are more similar due to extended periods of socialist 
party government in the 1980s.  
There are other examples of differentiation among the four cases. Spain has a 
tradition of skilful and cohesive bodies of civil servants ('cuerpos'). There is a certain 
professionalism among Spanish civil servants, which can only rarely be found in Greece 
or Italy. Indeed, political ties to governing parties and relative lack of professionalism 
are two dimensions which, from time to time, have particularly characterised the core of 
the Greek and Italian civil service at least since the end of the Second World War. If one 
was pressed to say which of the four state bureaucracies looked more alike, chances are 
that the Greek and the Italian bureaucracies would be selected as similar cases which, as 
a sub-group, were different from the Portuguese and the Spanish bureaucracies. The 
similarity of the Greek with the Italian case has also become more visible in the kinds 
and the fate of administrative reforms which have been aborted. Examples include the 
reform of ‘dirigenza’ (in the 1970s) and the Giannini reforms in Italy (in the 1990s) and 
the continuously changing pay scale and grade scale of civil servants in post-
authoritarian Greece.  
Still, there were important differences between the Greek and the Italian cases. 
While Greek party governments of the second half of the twentieth century used to 
actively intervene in the day-today operations of the Greek civil service, the Italian 
coalition governments of the post-war period reached an arrangement with the civil 
servants. Except for the recruitment of new personnel, which in Italy has habitually 
fallen victim to quotas and exchanges agreed among the ruling political parties 
('lotizzazione’), other aspects of the functioning of the civil service were left to civil 
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servants themselves. This trend was the result of the 'art of arrangement', as Sabino 
Cassese has called it (1993b: 335 and 339).  
On the other hand, in the case of Portugal, the intervention of political parties 
seems to  have been more extensive in the immediate post-authoritarian period and again 
after 1987. In regard to party-led intervention in the bureaucracy, the case of Spain 
seemed to be similar with that of Portugal or Greece only after 1982. In view of all these 
differences among the four bureaucracies, the fact that we study them together does not 
mean that we lump them together on all counts. 
 The second caveat is that there is much less administrative uniformity within 
each of the four states than an all pervasive ‘model’ of South European bureaucracy 
would imply. To start with, between 1977 and 1983 Spain became a quasi-federal state 
through its division in seventeen 'Communidades Autonomas'. Given the comparatively 
large size of Spain, one should then speak of seventeen regional public administrations 
in addition to the country’s central public administration. Also since 1970 Italy has been 
divided into fifteen regions which have been governed by different political parties 
(regional governments). So the administrative system of some regions of Spain or Italy 
may be quite different from the rest of the country and may function in a different 
manner. For example, in Spain, the Basque Country seems to be nearly an independent 
entity, almost complete with all the typical authorities of a modern state, except for an 
army and a ministry of foreign affairs of its own. Less extended, but still remarkable 
autonomy can be observed in the administrations of Catalonia and Galicia.  
In Italy, the quality of public services obtained in some areas of the South (e.g., 
Naples, Calabria, Sicily) is much lower than that of the equivalent services in the North 
of Italy. Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti have linked this discrepancy to variable levels of 
institutional development and social capital. Besides, another differentiation which 
should be noted is the following: despite impressions to the contrary, there are quarters 
of the South European bureaucracies which are reliable and function reasonably well. In 
Italy, this holds true for the treasury, the diplomatic service, the Council of the State and 
the Audit Office (Meny 1993: 452-453). In Greece, the same is true for the Council of 
the State, the Bank of Greece and the Ombudsman. 
 
 
 
F. Conclusions  
 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the four South European bureaucracies were 
sluggish, often partisan, sometimes unable or reluctant to implement the policies of 
incumbent governments and, last but not least, amenable to be treated as ‘dumping 
grounds’ for the political clients of the governing elites. While bureaucratic inefficiency 
and corruption have often been associated particularly with South European 
bureaucracies, the most important characteristics which distinguish them from the rest of 
West European bureaucracies are different ones. These characteristics are related to 
internal organization and to personnel recruitment and management.  
South European bureaucracies should not be considered excessively large. Their 
alleged excess size has not been borne out of our brief cross-national comparisons of 
public employment or of public expenditure or of government revenue. South European 
states are not overgrown. However, their higher echelons of their civil service 
hierarchies are excessively politicised. Recruitment to the public administration and the 
public sector is still often done on the basis of particularistic criteria. Politicisation of the 
higher civil service, particularistic recruitment to the public sector and particularistic 
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provision of social protection are aspects of clientelism. Clientelism has affected the way 
resources, including personnel, have been distributed in the public sector of South 
European societies. The public sector of these societies remains uneven in terms of 
resources and performance. It has also lacked a distinct administrative elite with the 
esprit de corps and the skills encountered at the top levels of other West European 
bureaucracies. Clearly there are differences among the four South European 
bureaucracies. For instance, the Greek and Italian cases seem more similar particularly 
as far as lack of an administrative elite is concerned. Spain and Italy are more advanced 
in terms of administrative decentralization, while Greece and Portugal remain 
comparatively centralized. In addition, within each of the four countries there is enough 
variation in regard to public administration and public sector performance.  
Yet a set of core characteristics of a South European ‘model’ is visible. These are 
long-term traits of the ‘model’ (or ‘family’) of South European bureaucracies and may 
be accounted for by the particular role that the state has played and continues to play in 
South European societies. The state has served a few specific social interests, including 
those of the capitalist class and the urban upper-middle classes. These vested interests 
have benefited from clientelistic practices and for this reason they have not mobilized in 
favour of a reform that would have altered the long-term characteristics of the 
bureaucracy. The capitalist classes have benefited from the development of ‘assisted’, 
i.e. state-dependent capitalism in Southern Europe. They have also benefited from the 
incorporation of segments of the middle and lower, urban and rural classes into the 
political system in a clientelistic, vertical fashion which is divisive of the interests of the 
latter classes. Along with state-dependent businessmen, also liberal professionals and 
segments of the self-employed strata have benefited from the type of taxation and social 
welfare patterns prevailing in Southern Europe. Among the self-employed strata, farmers 
in particular have benefited from EU and state subsidies and tax exemptions. The 
interests of these strata were not compatible with a reform of the bureaucracy which 
would have upset their particularistic access to the state. The reason was that taxation 
and welfare policies and their less-than-rigorous implementation have allowed the 
aforementioned strata to generate additional income.  
A similar logic applies to the welfare state. Social transfers are organized in a 
compartmentalized fashion, privileging some social categories and groups, such as 
liberal professionals and public sector employees, against the rest of the population. The 
state in Southern Europe has often served a ‘social shock absorber’, i.e., it has offered 
employment outlets to members of the middle and lower strata who are out of work. 
These functions explain the historical endurance of the South European ‘model’ of state 
bureaucracy. The more recent perseverance of the ‘model’ may be accounted for by 
other reasons. These include the priorities of transition to democracy, which did not 
emphasize administrative modernization, and the simultaneous precipitation of 
challenges such as democratisation and Europeanization.   
  Such directions of change are routes which are followed by other West and 
North European states. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, chances are that 
West, North and South European bureaucracies have started converging. They may 
converge even more in the future. Domestic developments, such as the passing of the 
post-war party system in Italy in 1992-1994, and, more importantly, international 
changes, such as the advancement of European integration, the end of the Cold War, the 
further diffusion and change of the ideas of New Public Management, the intensification 
of global competition among national economies, and the spread of new technologies, 
have created a new political, economic and technological environment for state 
bureaucracies, including those of Southern Europe. This totally new environment is very 
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different from the historical context which was relevant for this paper, i.e., from 
democratisation and its aftermath. How South European bureaucracies will adapt to the 
new environment remains an open question. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The public bureaucracies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain may be set apart from 
the rest of West European bureaucracies. Until the mid-1990s, the former were 
distinguished from the latter by certain interrelated structural characteristics. The 
characteristics were extended politicisation of the top administrative ranks; enduring 
patronage patterns in recruitment to the public sector; uneven distribution of human 
resources; formalism and legalism; and, with the exception of Spain, absence of a 
typical European administrative elite. Taken together, these characteristics constitute 
a particular ‘model’ or ‘family’ of state bureaucracies. The traditions of authoritarianism 
and political polarization, which characterized Southern Europe in the past, may be 
reflected in this model. The characteristics were associated with the type of capitalist 
and state development in Southern Europe. The state in Southern Europe has actively 
shaped social class, professional and gender inequalities in the context of piecemeal 
clientelistic practices, both at the individual and the collective level: favoured 
individual citizens and privileged social classes and interest groups have had 
preferential access to the state. In the late twentieth century, South European 
bureaucracies have started evolving towards decentralization and privatisation. 
However, convergence of South European bureaucracies with the bureaucracies of 
other EU member-states is an open question, because in the last thirty years the 
former faced the precipitation of simultaneous challenges, such as democratization, 
modernization and Europeanization.    
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